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Abstract
Although people are good at classifying emotions, they also make mistakes.
These errors tend to be negatively biased and potentially serve a protective function.
Research on biases in emotion perception has largely focused on perception of individual
faces and little is known about biases in evaluations of crowds. In the first investigation, I
conducted six experiments, evaluating anger bias—a tendency to judge facial expressions
as angry—in the context of single faces and emotionally homogenous crowds. I found
that observers were biased to classify faces as angry, especially when evaluating crowds.
This amplified bias emerged in the context of perceptual uncertainty and reached peak
intensity for crowds with four members. Observers endorsed anger bias regardless of
whether angry faces were discriminated against positive (happy) or negative (fearful)
expressions. Anger bias persisted despite variability in identity and gender but was
strongest for evaluations of male faces. In the second investigation, I conducted two
experiments evaluating anger bias in the context of emotionally heterogenous crowds.
Observers endorsed anger bias in the context of lower intensities of expression. Although,
observers showed difficulty in accurately classifying crowds consisting of relatively
balanced number of angry and happy faces displaying higher intensities of expression,
these errors were not biased. In other words, anger bias emerged when judgments were
difficult in the context of low perceptual information, but not in the context of clear and
yet contradictory information. This series of studies provide insight into sensitivity and
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bias in crowd perception and suggest that bias is amplified in crowds in the context of
scarce diagnostic information.
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CHAPTER 1: General Introduction
A brief overview of facial expressions
Facial expressions reflect morphological changes in the face and often
communicate information about a person’s internal affect (Ekman, 1992; Ekman, Frisen,
& Hager, 2002). Researchers have outlined two dominant conceptualizations of facial
expressions: categorical and dimensional. Within the categorical framework, there are
discrete facial expressions, with happiness, anger, sadness, fear, disgust, and surprise as
the main six that are often reported to have unique adaptive functions and are consistent
across many cultures (Ekman & Cordaro, 2011; Izard, 1994; Panksepp & Watt, 2011).
These expressions of emotion are typically identified based on particular changes in
facial musculature, such as an upward or downward mouth, widening or narrowing of the
eyes, and brow lowering or raising. Within the dimensional and constructionist
frameworks, perceivers process information along the valence and arousal dimensions,
which encompass the negative–positive and excitatory–calming continuums (Feldman
Barrett, 2006; Russel, 1994). The observer then reconstructs the category based on
context, with encoding of affect occurring prior to explicit categorization of expression.
Research suggests that perceivers are reliably able to identify facial expressions
and discriminate them from each other (Calvo & Lundqvist, 2008; Elfenbein & Ambady,
2002; Tottenham et al., 2009). People are even skilled at emotion recognition when faces
are scrambled and obscured (Bombari et al., 2013) or are seen in the periphery for
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extremely short periods of time (Bayle, Schoendorff, Henaff, & Krolak-Salmon, 2011;
Calvo & Lundqvist, 2008; Goren & Wilson, 2006; Milders, Sahraie, & Logan, 2008).
People nonetheless make mistakes when classifying facial expressions, and some studies
have focused on the types of confusions or systematic errors perceivers tend to make.
Fear and surprise are frequently confused, (Palermo & Coltheart, 2004; Tottenham et al.,
2009), sadness is occasionally confused with disgust, fear, or neutral facial expressions,
and disgust is occasionally confused with anger (Palermo & Coltheart, 2004; Recio,
Schacht, & Sommer, 2013; Tottenham et al., 2009).
The majority of research on classification of facial expressions has used posed
and prototypical or full-blown representations of facial expressions, as well as forcedchoice response tasks with predetermined categorical labels (Calvo & Nummenmaa,
2016). When perceivers are given the opportunity to freely evaluate spontaneous facial
expressions, they display more difficulty with recognition and often assign more than one
label (Kayyal & Russel, 2013; Motley & Camden, 1988; Naab & Russell, 2007).
Perceivers also make more errors when evaluating subtle facial expressions, which are
often more representative of real-world interactions (e.g., Calder, Rowland et al., 2000;
Matsumoto & Hwang, 2014). Nonetheless, facial expressions are reliably discriminated,
with happiness being identified more accurately and quickly compared to other emotions
(Calvo & Lundqvist, 2008).
Not only are perceivers able to identify facial expressions, they may also use them
to infer other information, which in turn may impact their behavior. For example, facial
expressions depicting anger can signal the potential for threat as it frequently precedes
violence and may influence the observer toward avoidance (Knutson, 1996; Yik &
2

Russell, 1999). Happiness, on the other hand, may signal warmth and potential for
affiliation and may influence the observer to approach (Hess, Blairy, & Kleck, 2000;
Knutson, 1996). In short, facial expressions are essential to social behavior as they
provide information about other people’s emotions and intentions and help people to
guide their own behavior.
Biases in perception of single faces
Despite being adept at recognizing facial expressions, research suggests that
people are nonetheless often biased toward rating individual faces negatively. For
example, neutral faces with certain craniofacial characteristics (e.g., a low eyebrow ridge
and wide nostrils) are particularly susceptible to anger misattribution (Shasteen, Sasson,
& Pinkhsm, 2015). Importantly, not only are these features associated with temporary
emotion states like anger, they are also associated with traits like aggression (Carré,
McCormick, & Mondloch, 2009; Said, Sebe, & Todorov, 2009; Stillman, Maner, &
Baumeister, 2010). For example, some faces decomposed into their low-spatial-frequency
(LSF) components are rated as neutral and yet threatening (Bar, Neta, & Linz, 2006).
Thus, perceivers seem to be particularly biased toward detection of threat and not just
emotional states. These biases seem to frequently emerge under conditions of uncertainty,
such as in the context of ambiguous or subtle facial expressions, rushed judgments, and
brief and unpredictable presentation times. For example, an ambiguous facial expression
like surprise can be judged as either positive or negative depending on the context, and
when perceivers are required to make quick judgments, they exhibit a bias toward
negative interpretations of surprise (Neta & Tong, 2016). However, this bias diminishes
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when perceivers are required to delay their evaluations and engage in reappraisal
strategies.
Thus, this negative valence bias may reflect early interpretations and result from
an initial automatic process in the context of limited time and ambiguous or incomplete
information (Davis et al., 2016; Neta & Tong, 2016). For example, perceivers display a
tendency to label neutral facial expressions as threatening after quick 39-msec exposures
(Bar, Neta, & Linz, 2006). LSF information is typically processed quicker via rapid
magnocellular projections compared to detailed information (i.e., high spatial
frequencies), and LSF surprise faces are also more likely to be interpreted negatively
(Neta & Whalen, 2010). Negativity bias diminishes with full intensity LSF faces,
suggesting that subtle or low intensity expressions may be especially vulnerable. Even
children as young as 7 months of age seem to exhibit a negativity bias (Vaish,
Grossmann, & Woodward, 2008). Relative to adolescents, they are more likely to rate
surprised and neutral faces negatively, and their responses are marked by fast reaction
times and increased corrugator activity (Tottenham et al., 2013).
Perception of facial expressions and gender. Gender has been argued to be
differentially associated with emotion and affordance of threat (Becker et al., 2007). A
number of studies have demonstrated that men tend to be associated with angry
expressions, whereas women are more likely to be associated with happy or fearful
expressions (Hess, Blairy, & Kleck, 2000; Hess, Adams, & Kleck, 2004). Perceivers are
quicker and more accurate at identifying angry male faces compared to angry female
faces and happy female faces compared to angry male faces (Becker et al., 2007). Neutral
male faces are also more likely to be misclassified as angry whereas neutral female faces
4

are more likely to be misclassified as happy (Ashby & Townsed, 1986; Becker et al.,
2007). Furthermore, features typically associated with angry expressions increase the
likelihood of a face to be categorized as male, whereas features associated with happy
expressions increase the likelihood of a face to be judged as female (Hess et al., 2009).
Some of these findings could be due to structural similarities between male or
female faces and certain emotions (e.g., lowered eyebrows being associated more with
both anger and more typically male faces), biasing certain androgynous faces toward
anger, fear, or happiness depending on those structural markings (Hess, 2009). There are
several possible reasons for the association between male faces and anger. It has been
argued that men are more likely to exhibit aggression and that certain cultures impose
expectations for men to be more aggressive (Biertnat & Manis, 1994; Fabes & Martin,
1991; Fisher 1993). Alternatively, there is also evidence that these biases may be driven
by perception of dominance and affiliation rather than gender per se (Becket et al., 2007;
Hess et al., 2004; 2009). Thus, certain facial structures, such as distance between eyes
and eyebrows, roundness of face, and shape of mouth region, may be markers for
dominance, and in turn, underlie gender bias (Becket et al., 2007; Senior et al., 1999).
Thus, men may be perceived as more aggressive because gender markers and dominance
markers are confounded within the structure of the face, which in turn may also interact
with experiences and social expectations.
Internal processes in the perceiver may impact perception. In addition to the
external characteristics of the observed face, internal traits and states within the perceiver
may also contribute to misperception of facial expressions. For example, individuals with
aggressive traits, including juvenile and adult criminal offenders as well as children and
5

adults with subclinical aggressiveness, display a “hostile attribution bias” in which they
are more likely to misinterpret ambiguous actions of others in a hostile manner (Dodge,
2006; Knyazev, 2008; Schönenberg & Jusyte, 2014). Individuals with social anxiety tend
to be more sensitive or accurate in their detection of threats as well as more biased to
judge ambiguous, or subtle, facial expressions as threatening (Yoon & Zinbarg, 2008).
Relative to non-anxious individuals, they may also be quicker at generating angry
judgments and slower at generating happy judgments (Maoz et al., 2015). Bell and
colleagues (2011) found that anxious and non-anxious individuals were similarly accurate
in their classifications of emotions, but differed in the types of errors they made, with
anxious individuals miscategorizing faces as angry and non-anxious individuals
miscategorizing faces sad.
Attentional biases and processes in individuals with anxiety are complex.
Specifically, individuals may show facilitated attention toward threatening stimuli,
difficulty disengaging from it, as well as avoidance, with some of these processes being
more automatic and others more strategic (Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Cisler & Koster, 2009).
Of note, most of the studies on perceptual biases in anxiety have been done with single
faces. Research into perception of crowds in individuals with anxiety is scarce and has
yielded inconsistent results. Some studies found that individuals with social anxiety
perceive crowds as more disapproving and emotionally costly (Douilliez et al., 2011;
Gilboa-Schechtman et al., 2015). However, other studies noted that despite longer
fixations on angry faces, individuals with anxiety do not rate faces more negatively
relative to non-anxious individuals (Lange et al., 2008; 2011).
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Negativity bias beyond face perception
These biases in face perception with facial expressions being classified as angry
or threatening are consistent with other areas of research that have documented a
negativity bias. Several researchers have described a fundamental negativity bias or a
positive-negative asymmetry effect, where negative information is weighted more heavily
than positive information, especially when contextual information is limited or
ambiguous (Baumeister et al., 2001; Cacioppo & Berntson, 1994; Ito et al., 1998; Rozin
& Royzman, 2001). For example, learning negative information about an individual is
much more likely to impact impression formation than learning something positive about
them (Peeters & Czapinksi, 1990). Individuals also form these impressions with less
information and report feeling more confident in their evaluations (Yzerbyt & Leyens,
1991; Hamilton & Zanna, 1972). In other words, people tend to form bad impressions of
others quickly and confidently based on very little information.
Although people occasionally show a positivity bias, they seem to nonetheless
rely heavily on a negativity bias. For example, infants and toddlers may exhibit an initial
positivity bias—in the absence of information, they display a drive to approach and
explore their environment. However, in the presence of both positive and negative
information, they tend to respond more heavily to the negative information (Vaish,
Grossmann, & Woodward, 2008). Adults tend to overestimate the likelihood of positive
events in the future (Weinstein, 1980), but forecast that negative experiences will have a
more powerful impact on their lives than positive events (Gilbert et al., 1998). People
also tend to generate more negative than positive labels for emotions, they remember
negative events more saliently, and they exert greater amounts of energy to escape from
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negative moods than to generate positive ones (Baumeister et al., 2001; Finkenauer &
Rimé, 1998).
Negative information also impacts decision making and information processing.
For example, individuals tend to weigh potential losses more heavily than gains,
especially in the context of uncertainty (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, 1984). Negative
information may also elicit greater information processing, as people tend to allocate
more automatic and intentional attention to negative information (Fiske, 1980; Schwarz,
2001; Sinclair & Mark, 1992). For example, people’s performance on a Stroop task
suggests increased interference from negative versus positive words (Pratto & John,
1991), and people require more time to make inferences about others’ bad behaviors
compared to good behaviors (Krull & Dill, 1998). Additionally, people experiencing
sadness tend to be more thorough in certain evaluations, although it is important to note
that individuals experiencing high arousal negative emotions tend to make quicker and
riskier decisions (Leither & Baumeister, 1996).
Biases may be adaptive
Not only are biases not necessarily arbitrary, they may serve a protective purpose
(Haselton et al., 2009; Nesse, 2005). People that are attuned to detecting threat in their
environment are more likely to survive, and they may rely on error management
strategies to mitigate risk (Haselton et al., 2009; Holbrook et al., 2014; Johnson et al.,
2013). When making a judgment in the context of uncertainty, one can make two types of
errors: a false positive (assuming something is true or present when it is not) or a false
negative (assuming something is false or absent when it is actually true). When the costs
of false positives versus false negatives are weighted differently, people are likely to bias
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their decision toward the less costly error (Johnson et al., 2013). These types of biases
have been documented across several domains of research, including perception of
auditory looming (Neuhoff, 1998), steepness (Profit, 2006), heights (Jackson & Cormack,
2007), avoidance of potentially diseased food (Garcia, Hankins, & Rusiniak, 1976) or
individuals (Kurzban & Leary, 2001), and mating (Garver-Apgar, Gangestad,& Simpson,
2007). In these examples, the costs of false positives (e.g., object arrives slower, extra
caution around cliffs, or missing out on potential sources of food or social partners) are
relatively lower compared to costs of false negatives (e.g., object arrives quicker,
recklessness around cliffs, serious sickness or potential death, and pregnancy and loss of
agency). In short, this “better safe than sorry” approach can lead to assumptions of threat
even in the absence of threat.
Neuberg and colleagues (2011, 2016) proposed that this self-protection system is
composed of internally consistent processes, including perception (e.g., angry facial
expressions), emotional reactions (fear), cognition (e.g., inference about intent), and
behavior (e.g., escape or fight). These processes may incorporate multiple neural systems
including the amygdala, which is often identified in threat-detection (Johansen et al.,
2010; LeDoux, 2000), the primary motor cortex and dorsal basal ganglia, which are
important in motor-preparation (Butler et al., 2007), the cingulate cortex and insula which
are implicated in less immediate threat responses (Fiddick, 2011), as well as a cascade of
cortico–striato–pallido–thalamo–cortical loops related to security motivation (Woody and
Szechtman, 2011). Biases can be especially adaptive to employ because they are quick to
engage, which can be necessary in dangerous situations when there is no time for
thorough decision making (Johnson et al., 2013). In short, these precautionary biases are
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most likely to emerge in the context of uncertainty, asymmetric costs, and pressures to
make a quick decision.
Crowds
Collectives of people are socially important, as they facilitate group behavior,
drive social organization, and amplify emotional experiences (Phillips, Weisbuch, &
Ambady, 2014). Social interaction at the group level is a critical element in human
survival, allowing for greater collective access to protection and resources (Van Vugt &
Kameda, 2012; Toob & Cosmides, 2005). However, they can also pose threats, such as in
group punishment and exclusion from the group, as well as interpersonal violence and
exposure to infectious disease (Cosmides et al., 2005; Kurzban & Leary, 2001; Neuberg,
Kenrick, Schaller, 2011; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Although there was a concentrated
effort toward understanding social behavior in groups in the first half of the 20th century
(e.g., Triplet, 1898; Lindzey, 1954), the cognitive revolution shifted the focus of many
research studies away from groups and toward cognitive and emotional processes within
the individual (Hogg & Tindale, 2008). However, some social psychologists have
proposed that social behaviors in crowds are sometimes guided by a “collective
consciousness” or a “group mind” and, therefore, studying them at an individual level is
insufficient (Le Bon, 1960; McDougall, 1920; Resnik, Levine, & Teasley, 1991;
Thompson & Fine, 1999). There has since been a significant increase in understanding
group cognition; however, affect and emotion remain a relatively understudied area of
research.
Emotions in crowds may be amplified due to “emotion contagion,” which refers
to “catching feelings” observed in others—an automatic process of mimicking other
10

people’s facial expressions, postures, and movements (Le Bon, 1896; Hatfield, Cacioppo
& Rapson, 1993, 1994). Socially induced affect is another term used to describe how
one’s own affect can change depending on that of another person (McIntosh, Druckman,
& Zajonc, 1994). Some theories of crowd behavior have pathologized the crowd
attributing rises in conflict to “group mind” and “emotional contagion” (Allport, 1924;
Baumeister, Ainsworth, & Vohs, 2016; Le Bon, 1896). For example, individuals in a
highly aroused and cohesiveness crowd may experience a loss of self due to
deindividuation; an increased sense of anonymity and diffused responsibility can then
lead to members of the crowd “losing control” and becoming violent (Prati & Pietrantoni,
2009; Stott & Reicher, 1998). The elaborated social identity model (ESIM) describes
crowd behavior in the context intergroup relations—not only does the crowd influence its
internal members, but the way an outsider views and acts toward the crowd may also
impact that crowd’s behavior (Drury & Reicher, 2000; Reicher, 1996; Stott & Reicher,
1998).
How good are people at perceiving crowds? Whether in the context of a
classroom, a protest, or a sporting event, individuals observing a crowd (as well as those
within the crowd) require an ability to efficiently examine the group and make judgments
about it. Perception of crowds is aided by an efficient mechanism—ensemble coding.
Instead of recruiting focused attention to inspect individual constituents one at a time,
ensemble coding pools and compresses information about a crowd into a summary
representation. (Alvarez, 2011; Sweeny & Whitney, 2014). Thus, the visual system is
able to represent groups rapidly and accurately (Whitney, Haberman, Sweeny, 2014).
Ensemble coding has been extensively evaluated as a computational process for
11

evaluating low-level visual features including position (Alvarez & Oliva, 2008),
brightness (Bauer, 2009), orientation (Ariely, 2001), and size (Chong & Treisman, 2003).
Perceivers are able to make quick and strikingly accurate judgments about the average of
each of these visual features as they occur in groups (e.g., what is the average brightness
of a set of circles? What is the average size of oranges arranged in grocery display?).
More recently, this computational process has also been investigated with more complex
visual features processed in higher-level stages of visual processing, which play a role in
social interactions. In less time than it takes to make a saccade (e.g., approximately 200msec), people are able to extract the gist of a group’s identity (Yamanashi Leib et al.,
2012), gender (Haberman & Whitney, 2007), gaze direction (Sweeny & Whitney, 2014),
and emotion (Elias, Dyer, & Sweeny, 2017).
In some cases, people can extract the averaged characteristics of a group more
accurately than that of an individual (Alvarez, 2011; Sweeny, Haroz, & Whitney, 2013;
Elias & Sweeny, 2017). For example, Sweeny et al. (2013) demonstrated that perceivers
are better at estimating the direction of a crowd in motion than the direction of a single
individual. A single neural representation can be randomly perturbed by internal noise
(e.g., Sweeny, Grabowecky, Kim, & Suzuki, 2011), but when several noisy
representations are averaged, the variability in each cancels out, leaving only a sharpened
representation of the group mean (Sweeny, Haroz, & Whitney, 2013). Ensemble coding
may also account for potential variability in a set (Haberman, Lee, & Whitney, 2015).
Perceivers are able to discount outliers (Haberman & Whitney, 2010), and there is some
evidence to suggest that not all items of the set contribute to the mean equally (Alvarez,
2011). Instead the visual system engages in precision-weighted averaging. For example,
12

probability, location, and size of certain items may contribute to how heavily they are
weighted in the average (Haberman & Whitney, 2010; Kanaya, Hayashi, & Whitney,
2018; Mareschal, Morgan, & Solomon, 2010). This can be especially important in
crowds, where there are multiple sources of heterogeneity, including gender, race, and
emotion. The ability to extract a sense of a group’s variance in addition to their average
can provide essential information about emotional crowds (Haberman, 2015). Crowds are
rarely unanimous in their expressions as members may display different emotional
categories or different intensities of emotion within a category. For example, a group of
faces all expressing moderate anger might have the same average as a group of faces
expressing mild and intense anger. Variance thus can provide information about the
reliability of the average or the coherence of a particular crowd.
In summary, compared to inspecting a group one member at a time, ensemble
coding provides the ability to extrapolate a concise summary representation of the
crowd’s overall characteristics. This mechanism can be especially useful in social
contexts in which it is critical to understand emotion or behavior at a group rather than an
individual level. For example, a panicked crowd versus a single panicked individual
within a crowd provides important information about a potential threat, and there is a
need to extract this information quickly and automatically. When making these types of
evaluations, it is important to understand the observer’s sensitivity—their ability to
accurately discriminate between categories, and the observer’s response bias—their
tendency to endorse a particular category. Research on ensemble coding, however, has
largely focused on sensitivity, and little is known about biases in evaluations of crowds.
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Biases in perception of emotions in crowds. Although research on biases in
crowd perception is limited, some studies have focused on processing biases in emotion
perception in crowds. For example, Hansen & Hansen (1988) introduced the face-in-thecrowd effect when they found that perceivers were quicker at detecting an angry face in a
neutral or a happy crowd relative to detecting a happy face among neutral or angry faces.
Because larger crowds did not impact perceivers’ ability to detect the angry target faces,
it was concluded that angry faces “pop out” in a crowd. Although some subsequent
studies (Horstmann & Bauland, 2006; Öhman, Lundqvist, & Esteves, 2001) found
evidence to support this Angry Superiority Effect (ASE), others have disputed it. For
example, Becker and colleagues (2011; 2014) found that when using photographic or
hyper-realistic faces rather than schematic ones, perceivers were faster and more accurate
at detecting happy rather than angry faces. Other researchers have also found this Happy
Superiority Effect (HSE; Hunt et al., 2007; Purcell, Stewart & Skov, 1996), particularly
when stimuli were matched on low-level visual features, such as luminance and contrast.
It is questionable whether ASE and HSE reflect “pop out” effects, as evidence
suggests that perceivers engage in serial rather than parallel processing of these faces. For
example, duplicates of faces do not speed up the search and the position of faces impacts
reaction times (Becker, 2011; Hampton et al., 1989). Additionally, it is unclear whether
the face-in-the-crowd effect is due to the saliency of the target face (e.g., angry) or
efficiency in processing of the distractor faces (e.g., happy faces) in the case of ASE, and
vice versa for HSE. To assess some of these biases in processing angry versus happy
faces within a crowd, Bucher and Voss (2019) took a different approach. Instead of
asking perceivers to find a particular face in the crowd, they asked them to report the
14

overall mood of the crowd. They found that perceivers were more likely to attend to
happy faces, focus on them for longer durations, and evaluate them more accurately. It is
important to note that in all of these studies, perceivers had the time to serially search the
crowds. Little is known about biases in perceivers who are only able to view crowds for a
brief moment. However, one study that used quick presentation times and assessed biases
in anxious and non-anxious individuals also found a positivity bias in healthy perceivers
(Yang et al., 2013). Of note, these crowds consisted of both female and male faces and
displayed “full-blown” prototypical facial expressions. In short, there is a huge gap in
understanding the extent to which perceivers are susceptible to biases in perception of
emotions in crowds, especially under conditions that present uncertainty.
Present Research
If perceivers are more likely to attribute threat to people with greater capacity for
harm (Neel et al., 2012), then based on numerosity alone, crowds should be especially
vulnerable to biased evaluations. Negative biases are also more likely to be engaged in
circumstances where uncertainty or ambiguity is high, such as when perception is
fleeting, uncertain, or unpredictable (Davis et al., 2016; Neta & Tong, 2016). Crowd
perception often relies on ensemble coding, extracting a quick gist summary, with much
of that information from the visual periphery. Thus, crowds impose perceptual and
computational constraints on perceivers that may encourage the use of heuristic processes
and exacerbate negative biases.
In the first investigation, I evaluated anger bias in response to single faces and
emotionally unanimous crowds. In Experiment 1, I predicted that observers would
engage a bias to categorize faces as “angry” (relative to happy), particularly in response
15

to crowds compared to individuals. I hypothesized that these biased evaluations would
emerge under conditions of increased perceptual uncertainty or ambiguity, such as when
faces display subtle facial expressions. Particularly, I expected anger bias to emerge when
sensitivity, or ability to discriminate between facial expressions, is low. If bias is related
to a target’s affordance to inflict harm, it should be specific for judgments of anger.
However, if anger bias only emerges in the context of evaluating angry versus happy
faces, it may reflect a more general negativity bias. In Experiment 2, I thus evaluated
whether anger bias would persist even in a design context in which only angry and fearful
faces were discriminated. Here, I predicted a liberal bias specific to the classification of
anger. If anger bias is engaged most strongly when diagnostic information relevant to
discriminating expressions is limited, then ambiguity from very basic perceptual
dimensions, like visibility, may also trigger bias. In Experiment 3, I thus predicted that
occluding the faces, and thereby limiting visibility and increasing uncertainty, should
result in similarly-biased evaluations of anger in single faces and crowds. The purpose of
Experiment 4 was to evaluate whether crowd size impacts the magnitude of anger bias. I
predicted that anger bias would have a non-linear relationship with crowd size, where it
initially increases with each member, but then plateaus as the crowd grows larger. The
crowds in the first four experiments were restricted to the same identity in order to isolate
the effect of numerosity. That is, all the faces in a crowd were of the same individual. The
purpose of Experiment 5 and Experiment 6 was to introduce additional variability in
terms of identity and gender. In Experiment 5, I predicted that observers would continue
to adopt an amplified anger bias in response to crowds whose members consisted of
different identities. In Experiment 6, I evaluated anger bias in response to single male and
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female faces as well as male and female crowds. I predicted that bias with low-intensity
female faces would follow the same pattern as with male faces, albeit with a reduced
magnitude, and possibly neutralize or shift to a happy bias for high-intensity expressions.
In the second investigation, I evaluated the persistence of anger bias under
additional conditions of uncertainty within the context of mixed-emotion crowds,
consisting of varying ratios of angry to happy faces and varying intensities of emotional
expression. In the first investigation, all of the crowds presented were homogeneous in
terms of facial expression (i.e., all angry or all happy). However, outside the lab, the
individuals that constitute a crowd are unlikely to unanimously express the same emotion
at the same time. Thus, the purpose of the second investigation was to evaluate how
observers navigate contradictory information when a crowd’s constituents express
divergent emotions at different intensities. In Experiment 1, I evaluated anger bias in
response to crowds with varying ratios of angry to happy faces. I predicted that,
consistent with the first investigation, observers would exhibit more anger bias under
conditions of uncertainty. Specifically, I predicted that anger bias would emerge in
response to more balanced ratios of angry to happy faces and diminish in response to
highly imbalanced ratios of angry to happy faces. Additionally, I predicted that bias
would interact with emotional intensity, such that observers would show more bias in
response to low intensity crowds relative to high intensity crowds. In Experiment 2, I
evaluated the extent to which heterogeneity in emotion and intensity impacts anger bias.
Specifically, in these crowds, half of the faces were happy, and half of the faces were
angry, but the intensities between the two emotions were varied. I predicted that anger
bias would be stronger when the two emotions were closer in intensity (e.g., half of the
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crowd expressing 50% intensity and the other half of the crowd expressing 60%
intensity) than when they were further apart in intensity (e.g., half of the crowd
expressing 50% intensity and the other half of the crowd expressing 100% intensity). I
also predicted that bias would be stronger when the two emotions were in the lower
intensity range (low-medium) and weaker in the higher intensity range (medium-high).
The second investigation, thus, provides additional insight into how other sources of
uncertainty (i.e., variability in emotion and intensity within the crowd) impact anger bias.
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CHAPTER 2: Anger bias in the evaluation of crowds
Introduction

The ability to discriminate facial expressions allows perceivers to gather
information about others’ internal affective states and intentions, influencing how people
interact and react to each other (Frijda & Mesquita, 1994). Indeed, people are quite
skillful at categorizing prototypical displays of emotion (Calvo & Nummenmaa, 2016).
Yet perceivers sometimes evaluate subtle, difficult to see, or obscured expressions and, in
some instances, these judgments must be made quickly. This is a particular challenge in
the context of crowds where there is an abundance of information— much of it in the
visual periphery— and the capacity to carefully evaluate each individual is limited (Awh,
Barton, & Vogel, 2007; Chong & Treisman, 2005). Under these circumstances, errors in
emotion classification are inevitable. These errors may not necessarily be arbitrary but
instead may reflect affectively-adaptive biases that are potentially modified by crowd
context. People tend to misinterpret single faces as expressing anger or hostility
(Holbrook et al., 2014). Yet surprisingly little is known about negativity bias in
perception of crowds. Here, we begin to address this gap by evaluating anger bias—a
tendency to judge facial expressions as angry—in the context of single faces and crowds.
Biased evaluations are often portrayed as being adaptive. For example, error
management theory is predicated on the idea that overestimating the presence of threat is
less costly than underestimating its presence, and it proposes that people avoid high-risk
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mistakes to minimize potentially negative outcomes (Haselton et al., 2009; Johnson,
Blumstein, Fowler, & Haselton, 2013; Nesse, 2005). Accordingly, people may more
liberally endorse the presence of anger, especially when their judgments are made with
low confidence (Holbrook et al., 2014). This adaptive mechanism is not limited to facial
expressions—it similarly cultivates protective judgments about loudness or proximity of
sounds (Neuhoff, 1998) and it encourages loss-aversion during decision making
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1984). Of course there are special circumstances which can lead
perceivers to adopt positive biases, like evaluations of in-group members (Lazerus,
Ingbretsen, Stolier, Freeman, & Cikara, 2016) or prolonged decision time, but initial
judgments of affect tend to be negative (Neta & Tong, 2016). Perceivers may be inclined
to judge individuals as expressing threat (or anger) presumably to avoid danger (Becker,
Kenrick, Neuberg, Blackwell, & Smith, 2007; Gibson, 1979; Holbrook et al., 2014).
Importantly, perceived threat depends on an agent’s capacity to inflict harm on the
viewer. If a single individual is assumed to pose potential harm, then to what extent
might many individuals, or a crowd, carry an increased affordance to inflict harm and, in
turn, elicit a more strongly biased evaluation?
Crowds and groups are socially important—they allow collective behavior, drive
social organization, and amplify emotional experiences (Phillips, Weisbuch, & Ambady,
2014; Shteynberg et al., 2014). To evaluate collectives, humans rely on ensemble
coding—a visual mechanism that enables rapid extraction of summary or gist
information, including average orientation (Parkes et al., 2001), size (Ariely, 2001),
location (Alvarez & Oliva, 2008), gaze (Sweeny & Whitney, 2014), identity (Yamanashi
Leib et al., 2012), facial expression (Haberman & Whitney, 2007), and biological motion
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(Sweeny, Haroz, & Whitney, 2013). Despite an abundance of research on sensitivity, or
the ability to correctly discriminate between the actual attributes of crowds, little research
has been conducted on biases that occur when perceivers make rapid judgments about
crowds.
Crowds should be especially vulnerable to biased evaluations. Logically, based on
numerosity alone, a crowd has greater capacity to inflict harm on a perceiver than an
individual. Negative biases are also more likely to be engaged in circumstances where
uncertainty or ambiguity in perception or decision making is high, such as when
perception is fleeting, uncertain, or unpredictable (Davis, Neta, Kim, Moran, & Whalen,
2016; Neta & Tong, 2016). Crowd perception is often made in just a glance, based on gist
information, with much of that information from the visual periphery. Thus, crowds
impose perceptual and computational constraints on perceivers that may encourage the
use of heuristic processes and exacerbate negative biases. We predicted that observers
would engage a bias to categorize faces as “angry,” particularly in response to crowds
compared to individuals. We hypothesized that these biased evaluations would emerge
under conditions of increased perceptual uncertainty or ambiguity, such as when faces
sport subtle facial expressions or are difficult to see due to occlusion. Particularly, we
expected anger bias to emerge when sensitivity, or ability to discriminate between facial
expressions, is low. We tested and found support for these predictions in the six
experiments described below.
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Experiment 1: Are crowds particularly susceptible to being misperceived as angry?
Methods
Observers. Eighty-three undergraduate students (58 female, 27 male) from the
University of Denver participated in Experiment 1. This experiment was run as part of a
larger study on emotion perception and affective reactions. The number of participants in
this sample reflected an attempt to capture potentially weak physiological effects
associated with this larger study that are not described in detail here. Our post-hoc
observed-power for examining the main effect of crowd size in this experiment was 0.71
(with alpha set at .05, captured by a matched-pairs t-test between bias in the crowd and
single conditions, accounting for the correlation between these conditions). All
participants provided informed consent and received course credit for their participation.
Each observer had normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity and completed the
experiment in a dimly lit room. This study was approved by the Institutional Review
Board at the University of Denver and the research was carried out in accordance with
the provisions of the World Medical Association Declaration of Helsinki.
Stimuli. Our face set consisted of four male actors from the NimStim face set
(Tottenham, Borscheid, Ellertsen, Marcus, & Nelson, 2002). We were interested in
examining anger bias across a range of facial expression intensities. Consistent with our
theorizing in the Introduction, we predicted that anger bias would emerge most strongly
for judgments of weaker intensity facial expressions, as they are more difficult to
discriminate and therefore pose more uncertainty than high-intensity facial expressions.
To create a range of facial expression intensities, we morphed full-intensity exemplar
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expressions from each of the four actors with their own neutral faces. Specifically, we
used Fantamorph software (Version 5) to create linear interpolations (i.e., morphs)
between a neutral expression and two emotional expressions—angry or happy—for each
of the actors. A norming experiment run prior to this investigation confirmed that these
interpolations did indeed produce linear changes in perceived intensity for all the stimuli
in our set (see Appendices). Note that the appropriateness of our stimulus set (and our
ability to measure changes in the magnitude of anger bias) did not depend on the lowestintensity expressions being perceived as perfectly neutral in valence—a bias can be
measured even with stimuli that contain diagnostic visual information (e.g., a moderate
level of expressiveness).
In our first experiment, we presented faces with five levels of emotional intensity
(20%, 40%, 60%, 80%, and 100%) from these two expression ranges. We used a
Gaussian edge-blurring tool (Adobe Photoshop CS6, Version 13.0) to smooth the
external contours of the face and hair and to diminish the rough edges of the cropped
faces. The background of each image was then replaced with a uniform gray color (RGB
= 170,170,170). The stimuli were presented in MATLAB (R2014b) on a uniform
background (RGB = 170,170,170; luminance = 27.5 cd/m2) on a CRT monitor with a
screen size of 27.3cm x 36.5cm, a resolution of 1024 x 768. Each face subtended a visual
angle of 3.75° x 4.53°.
Procedure. We used a within-subjects design in which each observer viewed and
evaluated emotional expressions on a single face (the single condition) and from a
collection of 12 faces (the crowd condition). The task was to categorize a single person’s
or a crowd’s facial expression(s) as happy or angry by pressing the right or left arrow key
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(counterbalanced across observers). Observers were limited to a binary decision to ensure
that they could not opt out of making an emotional classification. This was particularly
important as we predicted enhanced bias on trials in which emotion classification was
difficult and uncertainty was high. There was no time limit put on observers to provide a
response. On each trial faces were randomly distributed around a centrally presented
fixation point. In the single condition, one face appeared at one of the four central
positions (randomly selected on each trial) to ensure that any potential differences in
emotion discrimination (i.e., sensitivity) between single and crowd conditions would not
be due to differences in visual acuity (that is, both conditions included diagnostic
information near foveal vision). In the crowd condition, the faces appeared in twelve
positions scattered across the screen. Faces within each crowd were identical, always
with the same actor and intensity of facial expression. For example, a crowd trial could
feature 12 images of the same person depicting a 40% happy expression (Fig. 1). We
introduced this redundancy intentionally, accepting that it degraded our crowds in terms
of real word sources of variability, such as gender, expressiveness, and identity, because
it provided a more important upside for our initial investigation. That is, because the
crowds did not contain any additional information for categorizing the expression, any
difference in bias in the crowd condition relative to the single condition could only be
attributable to the increase in number of faces. The identity and intensity of the face,
however, varied across trials.
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Figure 1. (A) Morphs between a neutral expression and happy (top row), angry (middle
row), and fearful (bottom row) expressions from one actor in our stimulus set. Intensities
depicted here include 0%, 20%, 40%, 60%, 80%, and 100%. (B) A crowd of 12 faces
from Experiment 1. Face identities were identical within each crowd on a given trial for
most of the experiments in this investigation. This ensured that our predicted result of
increased bias for evaluations of crowds (relative to individuals), were it to occur, could
be accounted for by numerosity alone.
To prevent observers from focusing on specific locations, we randomly and
independently jittered the location of each face by 1-to-15 pixels both horizontally and
vertically on each trial. Single faces and crowds were presented for 100-ms, a
presentation time brief enough to prevent observers from making deliberate saccades to
individual faces (Findlay & Walker, 1999). Each face was followed by a pattern mask (70
rectangular pieces derived from the preceding image, reshuffled into a new image) shown
for 250-msec. This approach ensured that the emotional faces and scrambled masks
matched in terms of low-level image characteristics, thus decreasing the visibility of the
masked image (Enns & Oriet, 2007) and preventing residual visual processing (Rolls,
Tovee, & Panzeri, 1999). Upon viewing each single face or crowd, observers indicated
whether that person’s or crowd’s emotional expression was happy or angry by pressing
the right or the left arrow on a keyboard. Identity, emotion category, and emotion
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intensity were randomly determined on each trial. Trials were randomized for each block
and observer. Each observer completed six blocks for a total of 480 trials. Each condition
(e.g., a crowd of happy faces at 20% intensity) was repeated for 24 trials across all six
blocks.
Analyses. We used Signal Detection Theory (SDT) for our primary analyses,
which allowed us to separately measure both sensitivity and bias in perceptual decision
making (e.g., whether a signal— in this case anger— is present) in the context of
uncertainty. In this experiment, there were two possible responses (angry or happy),
resulting in four possible SDT outcomes (see table below): “hit” (angry face(s) identified
as angry), “miss” (angry face(s) identified as happy), “false alarm” (happy face(s)
identified as angry), and “correct rejection” (happy face(s) identified as happy).

Response
Yes: “Angry”
No: “Happy”

Signal (Angry)
Hit
Miss

Noise (Happy)
False Alarm
Correct Rejection

Table 1. Signal Detection Theory analysis parameters for crowds of angry and happy
faces.
Based on these four response outcomes, we derived d’, an index of sensitivity
which captures an observer’s ability to correctly discriminate between angry and happy
expressions (Dorfman & Alf, 1968; Macmillan, 1993). We also calculated criterion, or c,
which measures an observer’s bias to respond a certain way (i.e., “angry”) independent of
whether the signal (in this case, anger) was present or not. For the single and crowd
conditions, for each observer, we calculated d’ and criterion for each level of expression
intensity using z-transformed hit rates (h) and false alarm rates (fa), where hit rate =
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(hit)

(f.a.)

, false alarm rate = (f.a.+correct rejection), d′ = Zh − Zfa, and c = −0.5(Zh − Zfa).
(hit+miss)
1

We replaced hit and false alarms rates of 1.0 with a value determined as 1 − 2∗n, with n
reflecting the number of possible hits of false alarms. We replaced hit and false alarms
1

rates of 0.0 with a value determined as 2∗n.
We provided the raw data as well as the calculated Hits, False Alarms, Misses,
Correct Rejections, Hit Rates, and False Alarm Rates for each experiment at
https://osf.io/8npx6/. Additionally, we included plots visualizing Hit Rates and False
Alarm Rates for all six experiments. We also conducted additional exploratory analyses
with reaction time as our dependent variable. We did this for each experiment in our
investigation. However, because RT was not our primary interest, we share these
analyses and results in the Appendices.
Results. We began with a repeated-measures ANOVA using d’ as our dependent
variable with factors of Numerosity (single, crowd) and Intensity (20%, 40%, 60%, 80%,
and 100%). This analysis yielded main effects of Numerosity F(1, 82) = 119.2, p < .001,
ηp2 = 0.402, and Intensity F(4, 328) = 178.4, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.824, and an interaction
between Numerosity and Intensity F(4, 328) = 9.51, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.104 (Fig. 2a). These
results are not surprising—emotion categorization should be (and was) better when faces
portrayed intense expressions, especially when many faces were present to carry this
information. This d’ analysis is nevertheless an important first step. We predicted an
increase in anger bias when uncertainty was high, and this initial analysis confirmed that
sensitivity was indeed poor (and that uncertainty was high) at low intensities of facial
expression.
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Figure 2. Sensitivity (A) and bias (B) for classification of angry and happy expressions
in Experiment 1. Each panel depicts performance across changes in expression intensity,
separately for crowds and single faces. Increasingly negative criterion values are plotted
up the y-axis in panel B, reflecting a liberal bias for classifying anger. Error bars in each
panel represent 95% confidence intervals.

We then turned to our main analysis, evaluating criterion first relative to a nullvalue of zero and then as a function of numerosity and emotional intensity. We found an
overall bias to over-report facial expressions as angry in response to both single faces as
well as crowds of faces. Note that a criterion (c) value of zero indicates no bias, a
negative value reflects a liberal bias to report the presence of anger, and a positive value
reflects conservative use of the anger response label. When collapsed across all
intensities of facial expression, average criterion was consistently negative: -0.171 (CI: 0.25, - 0.91) in the single face condition (one-sample t-test: t[82] = -4.284 , p < 0.001, d =
0.47) and -0.274 (CI: -0.35, -0.20) in the crowd condition (one-sample t-test: t[82] = 7.709, p < 0.001, d = 0.85). Across observers, the strength of anger bias for evaluations of
single faces and crowds was positively correlated (R2 = 0.60), suggesting a shared
mechanism.
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A repeated-measures ANOVA with criterion as our dependent variable revealed
significant main effects of Numerosity, F(1, 82) = 16.57, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.13 and
Intensity, F(4, 328) = 25.84, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.372, as well as an interaction between
Numerosity and Intensity F(4, 328) = 3.822, p < .01, ηp2 = 0.045. Observers were more
likely to misclassify crowds as being angry compared to single faces, and this
amplification of anger bias in response to crowds was particularly evident at lower
intensities of facial expressions. Anger bias, in general, was present at lower intensities
for both crowds and single faces, dissipating at higher intensities of facial expression
(Fig. 2b). Thus, these data suggest that high perceptual uncertainty (e.g., low intensity
facial expressions) and high threat potential (e.g., crowds) may independently and
interactively engage anger bias.
Experiment 2: Is amplified evaluative bias for crowds especially strong for
categorizations of anger?
Angry and fearful expressions can signal potential threat, but unlike anger, which
is typically associated with approach behavior from another person, fear is associated
with avoidant behavior (Adams, Ambady, Macrae, & Kleck, 2006). If the bias we
measured in Experiment 1 is related to a target’s affordance to inflict harm, it should be
specific for judgments of anger, and/or stronger for evaluations of anger compared with
fearful expressions. Experimentally speaking, such an anger bias would persist even in a
design context in which only angry and fearful faces were discriminated. If, on the other
hand, the bias reflects a more generic heuristic to report negative emotion relative to
positive emotion, then an anger-specific bias should not be present when perceivers
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discriminate angry and fearful expressions. Experiment 2 disambiguated these
hypotheses. We predicted the former, indicating a liberal bias specific to the classification
of anger.
Method
Observers. In order to obtain the same power as in Experiment 1 (with alpha set
at .05, based on a simple two-tailed matched-pairs t-test between bias in the crowd and
single conditions), we would have, of course, needed to once again collect data from 83
observers. But unlike Experiment 1, we did not run Experiment 2 while simultaneously
collecting physiological data. In Experiment 1, observers were required to wait four
seconds between image presentations, so as not to interfere with the physiological
recording. This was not a concern in Experiment 2, which allowed us to nearly double the
trial count for each observer. We thus decided to run only thirty observers. Thirty new
observers (24 female, 6 male) provided consent and participated in Experiment 2. Each
observer had normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity.
Stimuli and Procedure. The stimuli and procedures were identical to those in
Experiment 1 with the exception that observers were required to discriminate between
two negatively-valenced facial expressions—angry and fearful. We used the same
morphing procedure as in Experiment 1 to create faces with six intensities of fearful and
angry expressions (2%, 20%, 40%, 60%, 80%, and 100%). Because we predicted that
anger bias would be amplified under conditions of uncertainty, we included this
extremely low intensity (2%) of facial expression in each of our subsequent experiments.
Observers discriminated between fearful faces and the angry faces from the previous
experiment. Observers completed 10 blocks for a total of 960 trials, with the exception of
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three observers who completed nine blocks for a total of 864 trials. Each condition (e.g.,
a crowd of fearful faces at 20% intensity) was repeated for 40 trials across all 10 blocks.
Results. In this experiment, each observer’s d’ (sensitivity) and criterion (bias)
were calculated for responding “angry” or “afraid.” A repeated-measures ANOVA with
d’ as the dependent variable yielded main effects of Numerosity, F(1, 29) = 54.61, p <
.001, ηp2 = 0.343, and Intensity, F(5, 145) = 97.69, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.906, as well as an
interaction between Numerosity and Intensity F(5, 145) = 10.12, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.259
(Fig. 3a). Consistent with Experiment 1, sensitivity, or the ability to discriminate between
facial expressions, improved with increases in the intensity of expression, especially for
judgments of crowds.

Figure 3. Sensitivity (A) and bias (B) for classification of angry and fearful expressions
in Experiment 2. Each panel depicts performance across changes in expression intensity,
separately for crowds and single faces. Error bars in each panel represent 95% confidence
intervals.

Criterion analyses revealed that anger bias persisted in this experiment with
observers misclassifying single faces and crowds as “angry” relative to “afraid.” Note
31

again that a negative value of criterion (c) reflects a liberal bias to report the presence of
anger. When collapsed across all intensities of facial expression, average criterion was 0.27 (CI: -0.38, -0.16) in the single-face condition (one-sample t-test against a null-value
of zero: t[29] = -4.96, p < .001, d = 0.90) and -0.43 (CI: -0.57, -0.29) in the crowd
condition (one-sample t-test: t[29] = -6.36, p < 0.001, d = 1.16). Across observers, the
strength of anger bias with single faces and crowds was positively correlated (R2 = 0.77).
A repeated-measures ANOVA with criterion as the dependent variable yielded main
effects of Numerosity F(1, 29) = 23.46, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.384, and Intensity F(5, 145) =
11.25, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.555, and an interaction between Numerosity and Intensity F(5,
145) = 2.332, p < .05, ηp2 = 0.074. These results are consistent with Experiment 1,
showing that observers are more likely to evaluate faces as angry when facial expressions
are weak and that this bias is amplified for judgments of crowds compared to single
individuals (Fig. 3b). Importantly, this experiment provided evidence that observers did
not merely adopt a generic negative bias when required to decide between two
oppositely-valenced emotions, such as happy and angry. Instead, high uncertainty due to
low intensity of expression interacted with numerosity to elicit a potent evaluative bias
specific to anger.
Experiment 3: Is anger bias for crowds amplified by other kinds of perceptual
uncertainty, or is it specific to emotional ambiguity?
If anger bias is engaged most strongly when diagnostic information relevant to
discriminating expressions is limited, then ambiguity from very basic perceptual
dimensions, like visibility, may trigger bias similarly to the weak expressionality in
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Experiments 1 and 2. For example, observers have been shown to sometimes misclassify
masked faces as angry (Nikitin & Freund, 2015). We predicted that occluding the faces,
and thereby limiting visibility and increasing uncertainty, should result in similarlybiased evaluations of anger in single faces and crowds. Such a result would indicate that
anger bias may be a heuristic that operates when perceptual decisions are compromised
via uncertainty from a variety of sources.
Method
Observers. Thirty new observers (27 female, 3 male) provided consent and
participated in Experiment 3. We selected this sample size based on the large effect of set
size in Experiment 2, which produced observed power of .99 with an N of 30. Each
observer had normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity.
Stimuli and Procedure. The stimuli and procedures were identical to those in
Experiment 1 with some adjustments that allowed us to test whether perceptual
uncertainty, independent of expressive intensity, enhanced biased evaluations of anger.
We kept the intensity of facial expressions constant at 40% across all trials because this
mid-range value elicited a consistently stronger bias for the crowd condition compared
with the single condition in our previous two experiments. We instead varied the
visibility of the faces by introducing visual noise. On a given trial, 0%, 15%, 30%, 45%,
60%, 75%, or 90% of the image pixels in each face were occluded by grey pixels (Fig. 4).
Each face on crowd trials was occluded by the same amount of visual noise. Each
observer completed 10 blocks for a total of 1120 trials, with the exception of two
observers who completed nine blocks (1008 trials total) and 2 observers who completed

33

12 blocks (1344 trials total). Each condition (e.g., a crowd of happy faces with 30%
occlusion) was repeated for 40 trials across all 10 blocks.

Figure 4. The range of occlusion levels (90%, 75%, 60%, 45%, 30%, 15%, and 0%) for
one actor and expression in our stimulus set.
Results. We conducted a repeated-measures ANOVA with d’ as the dependent
variable and factors of Numerosity (single, crowd), and Occlusion (0%, 15%, 30%, 45%,
60%, 75%, or 90%). This analysis yielded main effects of Numerosity, F(1, 29) = 92.63,
p < .001, ηp2 = 0.707, and Occlusion, F(6, 174) = 130, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.921, as well as an
interaction between Numerosity and Occlusion, F(6, 174) = 9.879, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.254
(Fig. 5a). Sensitivity increased as occlusion decreased, with crowds being easier to
discriminate relative to single faces, especially when the faces were easier to see.
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Figure 5. Sensitivity (A) and bias (B) for classification of angry and happy expressions
in Experiment 3. Each panel depicts performance across changes in the amount of face
occlusion, separately for crowds and single faces. Error bars in each panel represent 95%
confidence intervals.
Consistent with Experiments 1 and 2, observers demonstrated a tendency to
classify facial expressions as angry. When collapsed across all magnitudes of occlusion,
average criterion was -0.24 (CI: -0.37, -0.12) in the single-face condition (one-sample ttest against a null-value of zero: t[29] = -3.89, p <.001, d = 0.71) and -0.28 (CI: -0.40, 0.15) in the crowd condition (one-sample t-test: t[29] = -4.55, p < 0.001, d = 0.83).
Across observers, the strength of angry bias for evaluations of single faces and crowds
was positively correlated (R2 = 0.67). A repeated-measures ANOVA with criterion as the
dependent variable yielded a main effect of Occlusion, F(6, 174) = 11.73, p < .001, ηp2 =
0.483, no main effect of Numerosity, F(1, 29) = 0.745, p = 0.395 (Fig. 5b), and an
interaction between Numerosity and Occlusion, F(6, 174) = 3.099, p < .01, ηp2 = 0.097.
When considered with the results of Experiments 1 and 2, these results suggest that
people produce biased evaluations of anger when perceptual uncertainty, and not just
emotional uncertainty, is high. Of note, at the lowest levels of occlusion (e.g., 0% and
15%), anger bias was amplified in the single condition relative to the crowd condition.
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This may reflect a scaling effect, since these conditions featured lower perceptual
uncertainty relative to the other occlusion conditions in this experiment. We are thus
cautious about comparing the 0% occlusion condition in this experiment with the 40%
intensity condition in Experiment 1, for example.
Experiment 4: How does the strength of anger bias relate to the size of a crowd?
Crowds are powerful visual signals. For example, people are more likely to orient
their attention toward a crowd’s point of gaze than that of an individual (Gallup et al.,
2012). Importantly, this amplified influence of crowds on perceiver behavior is nonlinear, increasing from 1 to 5 members but plateauing with increases in size up to 15
members (Milgram, Bickman, & Berkowitz, 1969). We predicted anger bias would have
a similar non-linear relationship with crowd size.
Method
Observers. Thirty new observers (24 female, 6 male) provided consent and
participated in Experiment 4. We selected this sample size based on the results of
Experiments 2 and 3. Each
observer had normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity.
Stimuli and Procedure. The stimuli and procedures were identical to those in
Experiment 1 with the exception that the number of faces displayed on each trial was
variable, and featured 1, 2, 4, 6, 12, or 24 faces. We also included an additional intensity
of facial expression (2%). We included more incremental increases in size for the smaller
crowds (e.g., 2, 4, 6) because we expected that each additional member may have a more
substantial perceived impact in smaller sets, whereas the magnitude of anger bias may
already peak by the time a crowd reaches 12 or 24 members. On each trial, observers
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indicated whether the face or faces depicted a happy or an angry expression. Each
observer completed three blocks for a total of 864 trials. Each condition (e.g., a crowd of
four happy faces with intensities collapsed) was repeated for 72 trials across all three
blocks.
Results. This experiment included several combinations of Numerosity (six
levels) and Intensity (six levels). Because evaluating each level of intensity for each
crowd size would yield 36 values of d’ (and criterion) and the goal of this experiment was
to examine the impact of crowd size, we simplified our analyses and increased power by
conducting our signal detection analyses only across the six levels of numerosity
(collapsing across intensities). A repeated-measures ANOVA with d’ as the dependent
variable yielded a main effect of Numerosity, F(5, 145) = 27.54, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.487.
This indicates that sensitivity for discriminating happy and angry expressions increases
with the number of faces in the crowd until plateauing around four to six members (Fig.
6a).
A repeated-measures ANOVA with criterion as the dependent variable yielded a
main effect of Numerosity, F(5, 145) = 3.953, p < .01, ηp2 = 0.12. Anger bias increased
non-linearly with the number of faces in the crowd, reaching peak potency at four faces
(Fig. 6b).
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Figure 6. Sensitivity (A) and bias (B) for classification of angry and happy expressions
in Experiment 4. Each panel depicts performance across changes in the number of faces
visible to observers. Error bars in each panel represent 95% confidence intervals.

Experiment 5: Does anger bias occur for crowds with additional variability in
identity?
Real world crowds contain variability in terms of facial expression, gender, and of
course, identity. We restricted these sources of variability in Experiments 1 through 4 to
isolate the effect of numerosity. In Experiment 5, we began to evaluate anger bias while
re-introducing natural sources of variability, starting with identity. We predicted that
observers would continue to adopt an amplified anger bias in response to crowds whose
members consisted of different identities, especially under conditions of higher
uncertainty.
Method
Observers. Thirty new observers (19 female, 11 male) provided consent and
participated in Experiment 5. We selected this sample size based on the results of
Experiments 2, 3, and 4. Each observer had normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity.
38

Stimuli and Procedure. The stimuli and procedures were identical to those in
Experiment 1 with a few notable exceptions. Unlike the previous experiments in which
each crowd consisted of members with the same identity, Experiment 5 included two
types of crowds—one in which each identity within the crowd was identical
(homogenous) and another in which each identity was different1 (heterogenous). The
crowd condition also consisted of 4 faces rather than 12, since Experiment 4 showed that
sensitivity and bias plateau around this crowd size. We also included a weaker intensity
(2%) of facial expression. The faces in the single and crowd conditions were restricted to
the four central positions around the fixation point. Observers discriminated between the
happy and angry faces from the previous experiments. Each observer completed eight
blocks for a total of 1,152 trials. Each condition (e.g., a crowd homogenous happy faces
at 20% intensity) was repeated for 40 trials across all eight blocks.
Results. We conducted a repeated-measures ANOVA with d’ as the dependent
variable and factors of Crowd Type (single, homogenous crowd, heterogenous crowd)
and Intensity (2%, 20%. 40%, 60%, 80%, 100%). This analysis yielded main effects of
Crowd Type F(2, 58) = 59.81, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.562, Intensity, F(5, 145) = 157.1, p
< .001, ηp2 = 0.915, as well as an interaction between Crowd Type and Intensity, F(10,
290) = 13.96, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.325 (Fig. 7a). Sensitivity for discriminating expressions
improved as emotional intensity increased across all conditions. The interaction shows
that sensitivity in the single-face condition was lower than sensitivity in the homogenous
and heterogenous crowd conditions at higher intensities of emotional expression. Of note,
there was no difference in sensitivity between crowds composed of identical versus

1

We are unable to show an example of the mixed identity condition due to copyright restrictions.
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different identities for five out of the six comparisons; we conducted six paired samples ttests comparing the two types of crowds at each level of Intensity: 2% p = 0.7296, 20% p
= 0.3439, 40% p = 0.0046, 60% p = 0.4871, 80% p = 0.497, 100% p = 0.3921 (a =
0.008333 with a Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons).

Figure 7. Sensitivity (A) and bias (B) for classification of angry and happy expressions
in Experiment 5. Each panel depicts performance across changes in expression intensity,
separately for homogeneous crowds (same identity), heterogeneous crowds (unique
identities), and single faces. Error bars in each panel represent 95% confidence intervals.
Consistent with the previous experiments, observers demonstrated an overall
tendency to classify facial expressions as angry. When collapsed across all intensities of
facial expression, the average criterion was -0.44 (CI: -0.60, -0.29) in the single-face
condition (one-sample t-test against a null-value of zero: t[29] = -5.78, p <.001, d = 1.05),
-0.44 (CI: -0.57, -0.30) in the homogenous crowd condition (one-sample t-test: t[29] = 6.73, p < 0.001, d = 1.23), and -0.44 (CI: -0.57, -0.30) in the heterogenous crowd
condition (one-sample t-test: t[29] = -6.61, p < 0.001, d = 1.21). A repeated measures
ANOVA with criterion as the dependent variable yielded a main effect of Intensity, F(5,
145) = 50.47, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.812, no main effect of Crowd Type, F(2, 58) = 0.044, p =
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0.957, and an interaction between Intensity and Crowd Type, F(10, 290) = 10.79, p
< .001, ηp2 = 0.271, but (Fig. 7b).
Consistent with our predictions, anger bias was strongest when observers
evaluated weakly expressive faces. Weakly expressive faces were also discriminated with
low sensitivity. Our data suggest that increased bias does not depend solely on the
presence of a crowd or the boost in discrimination that comes from seeing a collective of
strongly expressive faces. Rather, there are two factors that interact to elicit anger bias—
uncertainty (which increases the likelihood of making an error in judgment) and potential
threat (which increases the cost of that error). When uncertainty is equally high for
discriminating single faces and crowds (i.e., at low intensities of facial expression),
observers appear to adopt an amplified anger bias in response to crowds, which carry
higher potential for harm. When discrimination sensitivity for crowds is improved
relative to an individual face (i.e., at high intensities of facial expression), amplified
anger bias for crowd judgments is either diminished (as in Experiments 1 and 2) or even
weaker than for single faces (as in Experiment 3 and 5), which carry higher levels of
uncertainty. Of note, there was no difference in criterion (i.e., bias between crowds
composed of identical versus different faces; we conducted six paired samples t-tests
comparing the two types of crowds at each level of Intensity: 2% p = 0.9685, 20% p =
0.3848, 40% p = 0.9129, 60% p = 0.8607, 80% p = 0.8169, 100% p = 0.3184 (a =
0.008333 with a Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons).

41

Experiment 6: Does anger bias occur for crowds with additional variability in
gender?
Gender is differentially associated with emotion and affordance of threat (Becker
et al., 2007; Neel, Becker, Neuberg, & Kenrick, 2012). Male faces tend to be associated
with angry expressions whereas female faces are more likely to be associated with happy
or fearful expressions (Hess, Adams, & Kleck, 2004). We thus included only male faces
in the preceding experiments to isolate a stable effect of anger bias. In Experiment 6, we
examined anger bias during evaluations of crowds of female faces, male faces, and
crowds inclusive of both. We expected that bias with low-intensity female faces would
follow the same pattern as with male faces, albeit with a reduced magnitude, and possibly
neutralize or shift to a happy bias for high-intensity expressions.
Method
Observers. Thirty-eight new observers (30 female, 7 male, 1 identified as other)
provided consent and participated in Experiment 6. We increased the sample size due to a
decrease in number of trials per condition compared to the previous five experiments.
Each observer had normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity.
Stimuli and Procedure. Stimuli and procedure were similar to the previous
experiments with a few notable differences. Four identities from the NimStim face set
were used: two male faces from the previous experiments and two new female faces.
Interpolations between a neutral expression and two emotional expressions—happy and
angry (2%, 20%, 40%, 60%, 80%, and 100% intensity)—were created for each of the
female faces. This experiment featured five conditions. The single-male condition
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featured one of the two male faces displayed at one of the four central locations on the
screen. The single-female condition used a similar configuration. The male-crowd
condition featured 12 faces, always just one of the two identities on the set. The femalecrowd condition used a similar configuration. The mixed-crowd condition also featured
12 faces, but with two male and two female identities, each repeated 3 times. Observers
discriminated between happy and angry expressions. Each observer completed 10 blocks
for a total of 1,440 trials. Each condition (e.g., a male crowd of happy faces at 20%
intensity) was repeated for 20 trials, with the exception of the mixed-crowd, which was
repeated for 40 trials, across all 10 blocks.
Results. We conducted repeated-measures ANOVAs with d’ and criterion as the
dependent variables. We evaluated factors of Crowd Type (single-male, single-female,
male-crowd, female-crowd, and mixed-crowd) and Intensity Level. We collapsed data
from the 2%, 20%, 40% intensities into a low-intensity condition, and we collapsed data
from the 60%, 80%, 100% conditions into a high-intensity condition. We did this to make
evaluation across the five different crowd types more manageable (reducing the number
of comparisons), and because our predictions about intensity were not specific to any of
the six levels in particular. The analysis of d’ revealed a main effect of Crowd Type, F(4,
148) = 74.33, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.756, a main effect of Intensity Level, F(1, 37) = 469.5, p
< .001, ηp2 = 0.949, as well as an interaction between Crowd Type and Intensity Level,
F(4, 148) = 24.78, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.401 (Fig. 8a). Figure 8a illustrates that emotion
discrimination was better for faces with intense expressions compared to faces with weak
expressions. Sensitivity was nonetheless better for evaluations of crowd emotion,
regardless of gender, compared to evaluations of single faces, particularly at high
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intensity of facial expression. Of note, although data were collapsed into low- and highintensity conditions in the analyses above, the figure presents the data across all six
conditions to be consistent with the previous experiments.

Figure 8. Sensitivity (A) and bias (B) for classification of angry and happy expressions
in Experiment 6. Each panel depicts performance across changes in expression intensity,
separately for male faces, female faces, both in crowds and seen as single faces, and for
crowds of male and female faces. Error bars in each panel represent 95% confidence
intervals.
A repeated measures ANOVA of criterion yielded a main effect of Crowd Type
F(4, 148) = 49.52, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.802, a main effect of Intensity Level, F(1, 37) = 46.5,
p < .001, ηp2 = 0.819, as well as an interaction between Crowd Type and Intensity Level,
F(4, 148) = 39.75, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.518 (Fig. 8b). Across all conditions, anger bias was
strongest for judgments of faces with low-intensity expressions. These results again
indicate that poor sensitivity and high uncertainty are key factors in amplifying anger
bias. The relationship between anger bias, gender, and crowd type was also clear for
evaluations of weakly expressive faces. Paired samples t-tests revealed that bias was
stronger in the single-male condition compared with the single-female condition (t[37] =
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-9.995, p < 0.001, d = 1.09). Bias was also stronger in the male-crowd condition
compared with the female-crowd condition (t[37] = -5.91, p < 0.001, d = 0.71). Anger
bias in the mixed-crowd condition fell between these two conditions, as predicted.
The strength of anger bias was only partly consistent with our hypotheses at
higher levels of intensity, when uncertainty was less of a factor. Observers adopted a
happy bias when evaluating female faces with high intensity of facial expression.
Average criterion was +0.12 (CI: -0.001, 0.235) in the single-female condition (compared
against a null value of zero with a one-sample t-test: t[37] = 2.05, p < .05, d = ) and +0.18
(CI: 0.10, 0.27) in female-crowd condition (one-sample t-test: t[37] = 4.26, p < 0.001, d =
0.69). Yet, surprisingly, anger bias was actually stronger in the single-male condition (M
= -0.53, CI: -0.65, -0.41) compared with the male-crowd condition (M = -0.29, CI: -0.39,
-0.19), t(37) = -7.62, p < 0.001, d = 1.01. This pattern is consistent with Experiment 3 and
5, indicating that the amplification of anger bias for evaluations of a crowd does not
happen consistently at high-intensities of expression.
Discussion
This series of studies demonstrated that people are biased to classify facial
expressions as angry, especially when viewing crowds of faces. We isolated a few factors
that elicit and escalate these erroneous evaluations, including numerosity and gender, and
especially uncertainty (in terms of subtlety or visibility of facial expressions). When
uncertainty was high, observers showed a tendency to over-endorse anger for single faces
and especially for crowds. This additional bias was non-linearly related to crowd size,
peaking at approximately four constituents. Anger bias presented itself independent of
gender, although it was strongest for evaluations of male faces, and it persisted in the
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context of variable identities. The bias to report anger occurred regardless of whether
angry faces were discriminated against positive (happy) or negative (fearful) expressions.
Thus, it did not simply reflect a generic negativity bias, although one may very well exist.
The relationship between bias and crowds was less clear when perceptual
information was clear or unambiguous, in which case anger bias either dissipated or even
reversed. For example, anger bias shifted to a happy bias for female faces, which is
consistent with the idea that in some circumstances female faces may be associated with
positive affordances and emotions (Becker et al., 2007). When expressions were easier to
discriminate, anger bias was also sometimes stronger for evaluations of single male faces
than crowds of male faces. Our sensitivity (d’) analyses point to one plausible
explanation. When faces are weakly expressive, perceptual uncertainty is high for both
crowds and single faces (because diagnostic visual information is scarce), and in this
context the increased threat-potential of crowds drives the anger bias. In contrast, the
additional numerosity of a crowd may be less impactful for driving bias when its
constituents are easy to discriminate. Our data suggest that high perceptual uncertainty
and high threat potential may independently and interactively engage anger bias.
We framed our predictions in the context of error-management theory (Haselton
et al., 2009; Johnson et al., 2013) and the theory of affordances (Becker et al., 2007;
Gibson, 1979; Holbrook et al., 2014). Specifically, we theorized that people overestimate
a person’s (or crowd’s) anger according to their potential to inflict harm, and we
proposed that crowds have higher affordance to inflict harm compared to individuals
based on their numerosity. Although we did not directly assess theories of error-
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management or affordances, our results are consistent with these theoretical frameworks
and provide a blueprint for motivating future research.
Real world events are often fraught with fleeting, chaotic, and unpredictable
information, requiring quick action. Anger bias may be a heuristic for guiding decision
making in the face of these sorts of pressures (Fowler & Johnson, 2011) that can be
rewarded and strengthened over time (Levine, 1959). Indeed, negatively biased
evaluations of single faces are amplified in the context of unpredictable exposure (Davis
et al., 2016) and rapid evaluation, and are diminished when observers are required to
delay their judgments (Neta & Tong, 2016). Future work should examine if angry bias
with crowds is similarly malleable. Additionally, anger bias may be a heuristic that
emerges specifically when perceivers are forced into categorical decisions. This is
important to consider given evidence that, when given the chance, people tend to provide
multi-dimensional evaluations of facial expressions, attributing a mixture of emotions
(Hall & Matsumoto, 2004; Riediger, Voelkle, Ebner, & Lindenberger, 2011). Thus, it is
unclear whether a similarly strong anger bias would emerge, especially in crowds, if
observers in our investigation had not been forced into a binary decision. There is,
nonetheless, value in investigating binary choices as many actions or decisions are
ultimately based on coarse categorical evaluations.
Most work on bias in emotion perception has focused on single faces. Conversely,
the study of crowd perception, also known as ensemble coding, has been dominated by
examination of sensitivity (e.g., Whitney, Haberman, & Sweeny, 2014). Recent work
shows that extreme members of a set tend to dominate evaluations of crowds. This
phenomenon (for the perception of a more basic visual computation—object size)
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occurred presumably because larger objects “pop out” (Kanaya, Hayashi, & Whitney,
2018). Our crowds were homogeneous, and thus could not have depended on this same
mechanism. Additionally, the unique pattern of increased sensitivity (i.e., higher d’
values) for high-intensity expressions hints that the crowd judgments in our experiments
may even reflect an alternative mechanism—probability summation—rather than
ensemble integration (Blake, Martens, Garrett, & Westendorf, 1980). Our data also do
not allow us to determine that the process of sampling, integrating, and then averaging (or
pooling) information across the faces in crowds even occurred in our experiments. Thus,
we cannot be certain that ensemble coding occurred in our experiments, nor was this our
objective. For these reasons, comparing our results with outcomes from studies that
directly examine ensemble coding should be done cautiously. Our findings nonetheless
add an important complementary piece to the growing crowd-perception literature, which
has largely focused on discrimination rather than bias in perception of facial expressions.
The affective bias we have shown here could potentially be moderated by a
perceiver’s internal characteristics, like risk-aversion or anxiety. People with social
anxiety tend to attribute a higher emotional cost to interacting with groups than
individuals (Douilliez, Yzerbyt, Gilboa-Schechtman, & Philippot, 2012), and tend to
interpret ambiguous information as hostile (Bell et al., 2011; Yoon & Zinbarg, 2008). To
our knowledge, just one study has examined biased evaluations of crowds among people
with social anxiety (Lira, Sang, & Chong, 2013), but the authors used emotionally
heterogenous crowds of full-intensity expressions of happiness and anger, which makes
comparison with our results difficult. New research examining how biases may contribute
to the maintenance of clinical anxiety is thus important to consider. The strength of anger
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bias may also depend on an interaction between an observer’s gender identity and the
perceived gender of faces in a crowd. We hope that future work will examine this
relationship in more detail, taking into account each observer’s attitudes about gender and
more systematically manipulating gender cues on individual faces and crowds.
Our results are unlikely to be due to differences in the deployment of visual
attention, different patterns of fixation across our conditions, or engagement of a visual
search process. We acknowledge that because we did not use an eye tracker, we cannot
be sure that observers always maintained fixation at the center of the screen. Given the
short presentation time we used in each of our experiments, this should not be a concern.
Single faces and crowds were always displayed for 100-msec, a duration too brief for
observers to have made deliberate saccades to individual faces (Findlay & Walker, 1999)
in either condition. Moreover, the faces within any given crowd were always identical to
one another, so attending to (or searching for) different faces, even randomly or
unintentionally, would not have imparted any benefit to observers. Finally, faces in the
single condition were always placed near fixation, so initiation of rapid, longer-distance
saccades on these trials was not necessary. The amplified liberal bias in the crowd
condition thus appears to be rooted in the effect of numerosity.
Our data do not articulate whether anger bias is rooted in perceptual or cognitive
mechanisms. Indeed, changes in criterion can be produced by both response bias as well
as perceptual changes (Morgan, Dillenburger, Raphael, & Solomon, 2012; Witt, Taylor,
Sugovic, & Wixted, 2015). Future investigations could potentially untangle the
contributions of sensory and cognitive mechanisms to anger bias by using methods like
drift-diffusion modelling (Ratcliff & Childers, 2015). For example, the liberal bias to
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report anger we have shown here could be understood in more depth by considering the
resting biases observers bring to each trial, the rate at which they accumulate information
about certain expressions in crowds, and the thresholds they use to report seeing anger.
Whether faces within crowds actually look angrier than single faces remains an open
question. We also hope that our basic research will inspire evaluations of bias in more
complex contexts, including naturalistic images, virtual environments, and real social
interactions.
We demonstrated that a bias to report anger on individual faces is amplified when
people evaluate crowds, and that this bias is engaged most strongly when diagnostic
visual information is scarce. Our findings complement the many examples of biased
processing of threat when it is more conspicuous, for example in terms of prioritized
attention (e.g., Dominguez-Borràs & Vuilleumier, 2013), access to visual awareness (e.g.,
Capitāo et al., 2014), or during visual search (e.g., Huang, Chang, and Chen, 2011). More
generally, our work illustrates the value of considering bias in addition to sensitivity,
especially for understanding how people see and understand information at the crowd
level.
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CHAPTER 3: Impact of ratio and intensity on anger bias in mixed-emotion crowds

Introduction
Perceiving groups is an important aspect of daily life. Whether in a meeting, a
sporting event, or at a protest, the perceived collective mood may impact the behavior of
those within the group as well as those observing the group (Wiltemuth & Heath, 2009).
Although people are generally very good at discriminating between emotional
expressions, when they do make errors, they are often biased toward negative
interpretations (Bar, Neta, & Linz, 2006; Neta & Whalen, 2010). These biases are
particularly prevalent in situations of high uncertainty, such as when it is difficult to
identify facial expressions due to lack of visibility or subtlety of expressive intensity.
Under these conditions, perceivers have a tendency to misinterpret faces as angry or
hostile. This negativity bias can serve as a protective mechanism as it biases the errors
that perceivers make toward less costly outcomes. Yet, bias in response to crowds is a
largely unexplored area of research. We examined the extent to which variability in
emotional expression and intensity within a crowd impacts anger bias.
Research on emotion classification biases has primarily focused on evaluation of
single faces (Holbrook et al., 2014; Neta & Tong, 2016; Neta & Whalen, 2010). For
example, an ambiguous facial expression like surprise can be judged as either positive or
negative depending on the context, and when observers are required to make quick
judgments, there is a bias toward negative interpretations of surprise (Neta & Tong,
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2016). This negative valence bias may reflect early interpretations and result from an
initial automatic process in the context of limited time and ambiguous or incomplete
information (Davis et al., 2016; Neta & Tong, 2016). For example, there is a tendency to
label neutral facial expressions as threatening when observers are exposed to these faces
for a mere fraction of a second (Bar et al., 2006). Neutral faces with certain craniofacial
characteristics (e.g., a low eyebrow ridge and wide nostrils) are particularly susceptible to
anger misattribution (Shasteen, Sasson, & Pinkham, 2015). Importantly, not only are
these features associated with temporary emotion states like anger, they are also
associated with traits like aggression (Carré, McCormick, & Mondloch, 2009; Said, Sebe,
& Todorov, 2009; Stillman, Maner, & Baumeister, 2010). These biases in face perception
are consistent with other areas of research that describe a fundamental negativity bias or a
positive-negative asymmetry effect, where negative information, particularly in an
ambiguous or scarce context, is weighted more heavily than positive information
(Baumeister et al., 2001; Cacioppo & Berntson, 1994; Ito et al., 1998; Rozin & Royzman,
2001). For example, people tend to form impressions more quickly and confidently based
on negative information about others (Peeters & Czapinksi, 1990), overestimate the
impact of negative events on their life relative to positive events (Gilbert et al., 1998),
and weigh potential losses more heavily than gains (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, 1984).
These biases may serve an adaptive function, as people that are attuned to
detecting threat in their environment are more likely to survive. Neuberg and colleagues
(2011; 2016) proposed a precautionary self-protection system which is sensitive to
detection of potential harm from others (e.g., an angry facial expression) and responds
consistently across perception, affective activation, cognition, and behavioral processes.
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In the context of uncertainty, observers may rely on error management strategies, biasing
their response toward a less costly error. (Haselton et al., 2009; Johnson et al., 2013).
This “better safe than sorry” approach can in turn lead to endorsements of threat even in
its absence. Biases can be especially adaptive to employ because they are quick and easy
to engage, which can be useful or even necessary in dangerous situations when there is
little time for protracted or deliberate decision making (Johnson et al., 2013). In short,
these precautionary biases are most likely to emerge in the context of uncertainty,
asymmetric costs, and pressures to make a quick decision.
Interactions with groups can have diverse consequences, as they have the
potential to offer security and protection to individuals, but also exposure to interpersonal
violence or infectious disease (Neuberg et al., 2011, 2016). Thus, it is important to
perceive crowds, and especially socially-relevant information from crowds, quickly and
accurately. To accomplish this task, the visual system relies on ensemble coding, which
pools and compresses information about the crowd into a summary representation.
(Alvarez, 2011; Sweeny & Whitney, 2014). Ensemble coding has been extensively
evaluated as a computational process that operates at low-levels of visual analysis to
provide summary representations of features such as position (Alvarez & Oliva, 2008),
brightness (Bauer, 2009), orientation (Ariely, 2001), and size (Chong & Treisman, 2005),
as well as at high-levels of visual analysis to summarize social features, such as identity
(Yamanashi Leib et al., 2012), gender (Haberman & Whitney, 2007), gaze direction
(Sweeny & Whitney, 2014), and emotion (Elias, Dyer, & Sweeny, 2017). In some cases,
judgments of a crowd’s average properties can be more precise than judgments of an
individual. For example, Sweeny et al. (2013) demonstrated that observers are better at
53

estimating the direction of a crowd in motion than the direction of a single individual.
When several noisy representations are averaged, the variability of each signal is
canceled out, potentially providing a more accurate representation of the group mean. In
addition to the mean, ensemble coding may also extract the variance of a crowd, which
provides information about the reliability of the mean estimate (Haberman, Lee, &
Whitney, 2015). There is some evidence to suggest that observers may discount outliers
and engage in precision-weighted averaging, where not all items contribute to the mean
equally (Alvarez, 2011). For example, probability, location, and size of certain items may
contribute to how heavily they are weighted in the average (Haberman & Whitney, 2010;
Kanaya, Hayashi, & Whitney, 2018; Mareschal, Morgan, & Solomon, 2010). Research
on ensemble coding, however, has largely focused on sensitivity. Little is known about
biases that occur during evaluations of crowds.
If observers are more likely to attribute threat to those with greater capacity for
harm (Holbrook et al., 2014; Neel et al., 2012), then based on numerosity alone, crowds
should be especially vulnerable to biased evaluations. There is also some evidence to
suggest that people may become more violent in crowds due to emotional contagion,
which may synchronize and amplify emotions, and deindividuation, which may
contribute to a sense of increased anonymity and diffused responsibility (Allport, 1924;
Baumeisterm Ainsworth, & Vohs, 2016; Le Bon, 1896). Perceivers thus might be more
likely to attribute threat to crowds. Indeed, previous work found that observers are biased
to classify faces as angry, which is amplified in response to crowds (Mihalache, Lamer,
Allen, Maher, & Sweeny, in revision). This anger bias in this previous work emerged in
the context of uncertainty, particularly in response to subtle or weak expressions of
54

intensity. These crowds, however, were homogenous in their emotion and intensity (e.g.,
a crowd of all happy faces with the same intensity of expression). It is unclear whether
emotionally heterogenous crowds would be similarly susceptible to anger bias.
Outside the lab, the individuals that constitute a crowd are unlikely to
unanimously express the same emotion at the same intensity and at the same time. The
purpose of the present study was to evaluate to what extent anger bias emerges when
observers have to navigate contradictory information within the crowd. In Experiment 1,
observers evaluated crowds of faces with varying ratios of angry to happy expressions.
We predicted that anger bias would emerge in response to more balanced ratios of angry
to happy expressions (e.g., 5 to 3) and diminish in response to highly imbalanced ratios
(e.g., 6 to 2 or 8 to 0). Additionally, we predicted that the strength of anger bias would
interact with emotional intensity, such that observers would show more bias in response
to low intensity crowds relative to high intensity crowds.
Experiment 1: How is anger bias impacted by variability in proportion of angry to
happy faces within a crowd?
Method
Observers. 47 undergraduate students (37 identified as female, nine identified as
male, and one identified as other) were recruited from the University of Denver to
participate in Experiment 1. This sample size was selected based on the results of a
previous investigation (Mihalache, Lamer, Allen, Maher, & Sweeny, in revision). Based
on the large effect size of criterion for crowds versus single faces (Cohen’s d = 1.18), an
N of 30 would provide us with power of .99 in this investigation, assuming an equally
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large effect size and number of trials per observer. We predicted a smaller effect size as
emotionally heterogenous crowds would likely introduce more noise in visual processing;
thus, we selected an N of 45. All participants provided informed consent and received
course credit for their participation. Each observer had normal or corrected-to-normal
visual acuity and completed the experiment in a dimly lit room. This study was approved
by the Institutional Review Board at the University of Denver and the research was
carried out in accordance with the provisions of the World Medical Association
Declaration of Helsinki.
Stimuli. Our face set consisted of four White men from the NimStim face set
(Tottenham et al., 2002). We used Fantamorph software (Version 5) to create linear
interpolations (i.e., morphs) between a neutral expression and two emotional
expressions—angry or happy—for each of the actors. There are 50 morphs of emotional
expressiveness (ranging from 2% to 100% emotional intensity in increments of 2%) for
both expressions. We then used a Gaussian edge-blurring tool (Adobe Photoshop CS6,
Version 13.0) to smooth the external contours of the face and hair and to diminish the
rough edges of the cropped faces. The background of each image was then replaced with
a uniform gray color (RGB = 170,170,170). The stimuli were presented on a uniform
background (RGB = 170,170,170; luminance = 27.5 cd/m2) on a CRT monitor with a
screen size of 27.3cm x 36.5cm, a resolution of 1024 x 768.
Procedure. We used a within-subjects design in which each observer viewed and
evaluated emotional expressions in crowds consisting of happy and angry faces. Faces
within each trial consisted of the same identity, but the identity varied between trials.
Each crowd consisted of eight faces. Varying ratios of emotions were randomly presented
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with the following combinations of angry to happy faces: 8:0, 6:2, 5:3, 4:4, 3:5, 6:2, 0:8.
We excluded the 7:1 and 1:7 angry to happy ratios so that results could not be explained
in terms of possible pop-out effects. Critically, all the faces were restricted to the same
limited range of intensities (e.g., all medium intensity) within any specific trial (e.g., 3
angry faces and 5 happy faces, all from the respective medium intensity distributions).
The selected emotional intensity distribution, however, varied between trials. This design
allowed us to isolate a potential effect of emotion ratio while keeping intensity constant.
Each set was split into three ranges or distributions of emotional intensity: Low (morphs
2%-32% intensity), Medium (morphs 34%-68% intensity), and High (morphs 70%-100%
intensity). Faces drawn for each trial were restricted to one of these distributions (e.g., 2
faces selected from the Low intensity happy set and 6 faces selected from the Low
intensity angry set). On each trial a random mean was generated that was within 6% of
the median (e.g., between 10% and 22% for the Low condition), and then faces were
randomly selected (e.g., between 2% and 22% for the Low condition) that would generate
that mean from a uniform distribution. We chose this approach because the variability in
individual faces eliminated the observer’s ability to use a single face as the exact
representative of the crowd, thus introducing additional uncertainty.
Faces were randomly distributed within the bounds of an annulus around a
centrally presented fixation point (i.e., all the faces were the same distance from fixation,
in a donut-shape). The reason for this more uniform organization of faces was to ensure
that any potential differences in the weighting of angry versus happy faces was not due to
differences in visual acuity (e.g., if the 2 angry faces in a crowd of mostly happy faces
appeared near the fixation point, potentially biasing the response toward angry). To
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prevent observers from focusing on specific locations, we randomly and independently
jittered the location of each face by 1-to-15 pixels both horizontally and vertically on
each trial. Crowds were presented for 200-msec, a presentation time brief enough to
prevent observers from making deliberate saccades to individual faces (Findlay &
Walker, 1999) as well as to prevent the counting of faces to determine the ratio. Each
face was followed by a 200-msec blank screen and then followed by a pattern mask (70
rectangular pieces derived from the preceding image, reshuffled into a new image) shown
for 250-msec. This approach ensured that the emotional faces and scrambled masks
matched in terms of low-level image characteristics, thus decreasing the visibility of the
masked image (Enns & Oriet, 2007) and preventing residual visual processing (Rolls,
Tovee, & Panzeri, 1999). Observers were required to categorize the crowd as “happy” or
“angry” “on average” by pressing the right or left arrow key (counterbalanced across
observers). Observers were free to respond as quickly or as slowly as they wished.
Observers also received three breaks, which were evenly distributed across the task.
Trials were randomized for each block and observer. Each observer viewed and evaluated
40 repetitions of each trial type for a total of 840 trials.
Analyses and Results. We used Signal Detection Theory (SDT) to analyze our
data, as it allows for analysis of sensitivity and bias when evaluating whether a signal (in
this case “anger”) is present. In this study, there were two possible responses (angry or
happy) on trials in which the number of emotional faces in a crowd was imbalanced (e.g.,
5 angry, 3 happy faces) resulting in four possible outcomes (see table below): hits
(predominantly angry crowds identified as angry), misses (predominantly angry crowds
identified as happy), false alarms (predominantly happy crowds identified as angry), and
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correct rejections (predominantly happy crowds identified as happy). Based on these four
calculations, we derived d’, which is an index of sensitivity, which in this case measures
an observer’s ability to correctly discriminate between angry and happy. We also
calculated criterion, which measures an observer’s bias to respond a certain way (i.e.,
“angry”) independent of whether the signal was present or not. The majority of the
crowds contained some level of signal (i.e., with the exception of the 0:8 crowd, even the
predominantly happy crowds contained some angry faces). We thus categorized crowds
of 8:0 (All), 6:2 (Most); and 5:3 (Some) angry to happy faces as “signal-present crowds”
and 3:5, 2:6, and 0:8 as “signal-absent crowds” (the 4:4 crowd was excluded from this
analysis).

Table 1: SDT analysis parameters for crowds of angry and happy faces.
Response

Signal (Angry) Noise (Happy)

Yes: “Angry”

Hit

False Alarm

No: “Happy”

Miss

Correct Rejection

The figure and analyses below pertain to findings related to sensitivity (d’).
Figure 1 shows two trends: (1) Observers were the most accurate at categorizing
emotions when the faces in the crowds exhibited the same emotion and at a high intensity
of expression (e.g., all the faces were happy or angry and the intensity of these facial
expressions was high). (2) As the ratio of the faces within the crowd became more
balanced, observers experienced more difficulty in discriminating the average emotion of
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the crowd. Both of these observations were confirmed via the statistical analyses reported
below.

Figure 1. Sensitivity (d’) for classification of crowds. Each panel depicts performance
across changes in the ratio of angry to happy faces, separately for each intensity of
expression. Error bars in each panel represent 95% confidence intervals.
We ran a repeated-measures ANOVA using d’ as our dependent variable with
factors of Ratio [All (8:0/0:8), Most (6:2/2:6), and Some (5:3/3:5)] and Intensity (Low,
Medium, and High). There was a significant main effect of Ratio (F[2, 92] = 132.87, p
<.001, ηp2 = 0.74) and a main effect of Intensity (F[2, 92] = 122.73, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.73).
Additionally, there was a significant interaction between Ratio and Intensity (F[4, 184] =
54.38, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.54). Specific comparisons then confirmed that in the All
condition, observers were less sensitive to the Low intensity faces (M = 0.65, SD = 0.48)
relative to Medium (M = 2.05, SD = 1.21; t[46] = 9.79, p < .001, d = 1.65) and High (M
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= 2.60, SD = 1.36; t[46] = 11.63, p < .001, d = 2.12) intensity faces. Observers were also
more sensitive to the High intensity faces relative to the Medium intensity faces (t[46] =
7.24, p < .001, d = 0.43). We observed the same pattern in the Most condition: observers
were less sensitive to the Low intensity faces (M = 0.32, SD = 0.35) relative to Medium
(M = 0.81, SD = 0.46; t[46] = 7.91, p < .001, d = 1.21) and High (M = 1.02, SD = 0.51;
t[46] = 10.49, p < .001, d = 1.65) intensity faces. Observers were also more sensitive to
the High intensity faces relative to the Medium intensity faces (t[46] = 4.15, p < .001, d =
0.45). However, we observed a slightly different pattern in the Some condition: observers
were less sensitive to the Low intensity faces (M = 0.16, SD = 0.41) relative to Medium
(M = 0.37, SD = 0.35; t[46] = 2.98, p = .005, d = 0.54) and High (M = 0.52, SD = 0.38;
t[46] = 4.49, p < .001, d = 0.90) intensity faces. Observers did not significantly differ in
sensitivity to the High intensity faces relative to the Medium intensity faces (t[46] = 2.42,
p = .019, d = 0.42).
The figure and analyses below pertain to findings related to bias (criterion).
Criterion values can be negative or positive, with negative values reflecting a liberal bias
to report anger. Figure 2 below shows three trends: (1) Observers were most likely to
misclassify crowds as angry when the faces in the crowds exhibited low intensities of
facial expressions. (2) As the intensity of facial expressions increased, the bias to
misclassify these crowds as angry decreased. (3) Ratio of angry to happy faces did not
appear to impact anger bias. These observations were confirmed via the statistical
analyses reported below.
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Figure 2. Bias (criterion) for classification of crowds. Each panel depicts performance
across changes in the ratio of angry to happy faces, separately for each intensity of
expression. Error bars in each panel represent 95% confidence intervals.
A repeated-measures ANOVA with criterion as the dependent variable revealed
significant main effects of Intensity, F(2, 92) = 17.43, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.28, but no main
effect of Ratio, F(2, 92) = 0.31, p = .74, ηp2 = 0.01, and no interaction between Ratio and
Intensity F(4, 184) = 1.23, p = .30, ηp2 = 0.03. Observers showed more anger bias in the
Low condition (M = -0.37, SD = 0.57) relative to the Medium (M = -0.12, SD = 0.28;
t[140] = 7.19, p < .001, d = 0.60) and High (M = -0.07, SD = 0.22; t[140] = 6.71, p <
.001, d = 0.77) conditions, which also differed from one another (t[140] = 2.29, p = .02, d
= 0.19).
In order to evaluate classification for crowds with an angry and happy majority of
faces, we also plotted accuracy as proportion of correct responses separately for each type
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of crowd (Fig. 3). The purpose of assessing data this way was to double check that
observers were in fact able to recognize happy and angry faces. We were especially
interested in comparing the homogenous crowds because these crowds were the only
ones without any contradictory information (all faces were angry or happy). Planned
comparisons between conditions where the Number of Angry Faces were 8 and 0
revealed that in the High intensity condition, there was no difference in accuracy between
an all-happy crowd (M = 0.85, SD = 0.18) and an all-angry crowd (M = 0.88, SD = 0.16;
αcorrected = .017, t[46] = 2.21, p = .032, d = 0.19). Thus, if d’ is low in other conditions
where there is contradictory information but at a high intensity of expression (e.g.,
multiple high intensity happy and angry faces within the same crowd), this would be
unlikely due to an inability to perceive happy or angry expressions. However, there was a
significant difference in both the Medium intensity condition (all-happy crowd: M =
0.77, SD = 0.18; all-angry crowd: M = 0.84, SD = 0.16; t[46] = 2.92, p = .005, d = 0.38)
and the Low intensity condition (all-happy crowd: M = 0.48, SD = 0.20; all-angry crowd:
M = 0.71, SD = 0.21; t[46] = 4.17, p < .001, d = 1.15). That is, unanimously angry
crowds were recognized better than unanimously happy crowds when their expressions
were medium or low intensity. These results inform our results of bias at lower intensities
of expression; a higher proportion of correct responses for angry crowds and a lower
proportion of correct responses for happy crowds reflect a liberal use of the “anger”
response category and a tendency to misclassify happy crowds as angry crowds.

63

Figure 3. Proportion of correct responses for classification of crowds. Each panel depicts
performance across changes in the number of angry faces in the crowd, separately for
each intensity of expression. Error bars in each panel represent 95% confidence intervals.
We calculated Positive and Negative Affect for each observer based on their
responses to the PANAS questionnaire, which they completed before starting the task
(Pre-) and after completing the task (Post-). Comparing responses on the Pre- and PostPANAS questionnaires, there was a reduction in both the Positive (Pre: M = 28.53, SD =
7.20; Post: M = 22.89, SD = 8.12; t[46] = 4.58, p < .001, d = 0.73) and Negative affect
scales (Pre: M = 16.21, SD = 5.65; Post: M = 14.32, SD = 4.22; t[46] = 3.05, p = .004, d
= 0.38). These patterns reflect an overall reduction in affect, possibly due to boredom
experienced over the course of a lengthy and repetitive computer-based task. To examine
if there was a relationship between observers’ mood and bias to report faces as angry, we
compared their affect scores as measured by the PANAS with their overall criterion
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values. There were no significant correlations between observers’ criterion and the
PANAS scales [all rs[47] < 0.19, all ps > .20].
Experiment 2: How does the anger bias interact with differing intensities of
emotions within emotionally heterogenous crowds?
In Experiment 2, we evaluated to what extent heterogeneity in emotion and
intensity of expression impacts anger bias. Specifically, the ratio of angry to happy faces
was locked at 4:4, but the intensities of the expressions within the crowd varied (e.g., four
faces expressing moderate anger and four faces expressing mild or intense happiness).
We predicted that anger bias would be stronger when the two emotions were closer in
intensity (e.g., half of the crowd expressing 50% intensity and the other half of the crowd
expressing 60% intensity) than when they were further apart in intensity (e.g., half of the
crowd expressing 50% intensity and the other half of the crowd expressing 100%
intensity).We also predicted that bias would be stronger when the two emotions were in
the lower intensity range (low-medium) and weaker in the higher intensity range
(medium-high). By conducting this study, we hoped to gain additional insight into
whether observers engage anger bias in the context of perceptual uncertainty (i.e., low
intensity facial expressions) or if they also engage it when perceptual information is clear,
but contradictory (i.e., a crowd of facial expressions that are all higher intensity, but
expressing different emotions).
Method
Observers. Forty-seven observers (34 identified as female, 12 identified as male,
and one identified as other) were recruited from the Psychology Department’s participant
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pool at the University of Denver. All participants provided informed consent and
received course credit for their participation. Each observer had normal or corrected-tonormal visual acuity and completed the experiment in a dimly lit room.
Stimuli and Procedure. The stimuli and procedures were identical to those in
Experiment 1 with the exception that the emotional intensity of happy versus angry faces
varied within each crowd while the ratio did not vary—the opposite of Experiment 1. All
crowds were restricted to a balanced ratio of 4:4 angry to happy faces across all trials.
The intensity of the angry face set varied from the intensity of the happy face set within
each crowd. There were two crowd types. The first crowd type featured four happy faces
that always had a constant emotion intensity of 50%. The intensity of the angry
expressions in these crowds varied from 2%, 10%, 20%, 40%, 60%, 80%, 90%, to 100%
(although intensity was kept consistent within a trial). The second crowd type featured
four angry faces that always had a constant emotion intensity of 50%. The intensity of the
happy expressions in these crowds varied from 2%, 10%, 20%, 40%, 60%, 80%, 90%, to
100%. Table 2 summarizes the combinations of crowds that were included in this
experiment. Observers were required to categorize each crowd as “happy” or “angry” “on
average” by pressing the right or left arrow key (counterbalanced across observers). Each
observer viewed and evaluated 60 repetitions of each trial type for a total of 960 trials.
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Table 2. All crowd combinations of emotional intensities included in Experiment 2.
More Intensely Happy
Crowd
Crowd Constant Happy
50%
Type 1 Emotion Intensity
Varied
Emotion

Angry
2%
Intensity

Crowd Constant Angry
50%
Type 2 Emotion Intensity
Varied
Emotion

More Intensely Angry
Crowd

50% 50% 50% 50%

50% 50% 50%

10% 20% 40% 60%

80% 90% 100%

50% 50% 50% 50%

50% 50% 50%

Happy
100% 90% 80% 60% 40%
Intensity

20% 10% 2%

Analyses and Results. We used SDT analyses to evaluate sensitivity and bias in
this experiment as well. As in Experiment 1, we calculated both d’ as a measure of
sensitivity and criterion as a measure of bias. In our previous experiments we treated
crowds with a majority of angry expressions as the signal and crowds with a majority of
happy expressions as the noise in order to calculate hits, false alarms, correct rejections,
and misses. In the current experiment, however, each crowd contained an equal number
of faces with happy and angry expressions. We thus used the relative intensity of the
happy and angry faces to classify trials into these categories. For example, a trial in
which the angry faces were more intense than the happy faces would be classified as a
“signal present” trial, and a judgment of that crowd as “angry” would be recorded as a
“hit.” Signal-present crowds included: (1) trials where the happy expressions were set at
50% intensity and the intensity of the angry expressions varied between 60%-100%, and
(2) trials where the angry expressions were set at 50% intensity and the intensity of the
happy expressions varied between 2%-40%. We wanted to determine sensitivity and bias
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as a function of the intensity of the variable emotion. In other words, how biased were
observers when one category of emotional expressions (happy or angry) was seen at 50%
intensity and the other set of expressions (angry or happy) was seen at 2% intensity?
Thus, each crowd type (with the constant emotion set at 50%) served as each other’s
counterpart when deriving hits, false alarms, misses, and correct rejections (e.g.,
identifying a crowd with 50% angry and 2% happy faces as “angry” would be a hit
whereas identifying a crowd with 50% happy and 2% angry faces as “angry” would be a
“false alarm”). Table 3 illustrates an example of how hits, misses, false alarms, and
correct rejections were derived for this example of a crowd:

Table 3: An example of how d’ and criterion parameters were derived from each crowd
type.
Response: Constant Emotion: Angry 50%
Varied Emotion: Happy 2%

Constant Emotion: Happy 50%
Varied Emotion: Angry 2%

“Angry”

Hit

False Alarm

“Happy”

Miss

Correct Rejection

Figure 4 below shows that observers were able to better discriminate crowds in
which the four faces from the varied-intensity set displayed low levels of expression
intensity, and sensitivity decreased as intensity of the varied emotion faces increased.
This observation was confirmed with statistical analyses. A repeated-measures ANOVA
with d’ as the dependent variable revealed the main effect of varied emotion, (F[7,
322]=63.495, p<.001, ηp2=0.54). Comparing neighboring emotional intensity points to
one another revealed that there were statistically significant differences in sensitivity
68

between 2% (M = 0.97, SD = 0.48) and 10% (M = 0.81, SD = 0.44; t[46] = 3.01, p =
.004, d = 0.34); 10% and 20% (M = 0.53, SD = 0.32; t[46] = 5.36, p < .001, d = 0.73);
and 20% and 40% (M = 0.12, SD = 0.24; t[46] = 6.24, p < .001, d = 1.43), even after
correcting for multiple comparisons (αcorrected=.007). No other neighboring intensity
values significantly differed from one another (all ts < 1.38, ps > 0.17, ds < 0.31).
Figure 4 below shows that observers displayed more anger bias toward crowds in
which the four faces from the varied intensity set displayed low levels of expression
intensity, and bias decreased as intensity of the varied emotion faces increased. This
observation was confirmed with statistical analyses. A repeated-measures ANOVA with
criterion as our dependent variable revealed the main effect of varied emotion, (F[7,
322]=35.83, p<.001, ηp2=0.44). Comparing neighboring emotional intensity points to one
another revealed that there were statistically significant differences in criterion between
10% (M = -0.38, SD = 0.27) and 20% (M = -0.28, SD = 0.22; t[46] = 4.29, p < .001, d =
0.38); and 20% and 40% (M = -0.13, SD = 0.20; t[46] = 4.97, p < .001, d = 0.75), even
after correcting for multiple comparisons (αcorrected=.007). No other neighboring intensity
values significantly differed from one another (all ts < 2.18, ps > 0.03, ds < 0.27).
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Figure 4. Sensitivity (d’) and bias (criterion) for classification of crowds. Each panel
depicts performance across changes in the varied emotional category’s intensity. Error
bars in each panel represent 95% confidence intervals.
Because d’ and criterion are derived from using data from both crowd types
(angry majority and happy majority), it can be difficult to see how each type of crowd
(with the constant emotion of angry versus happy) was evaluated by observers. We thus
plotted and analyzed accuracy as the proportion of correct responses separately for each
constant emotion (Fig. 5). A repeated-measures ANOVA with accuracy as the dependent
variable and factors of Constant Emotion (angry, happy) and Intensity (2%, 10%, 20%,
40%, 60%, 80%,90%, 100%) revealed significant main effects of both Constant Emotion,
(F[1, 46]=73.91, p<.001, ηp2=0.62) and Intensity (F[7, 322]=51.86, p<.001, ηp2 =0.53), as
well as a significant interaction between Constant Emotion and Intensity (F[7,
322]=44.44, p<.001, ηp2=0.49). Planned comparisons between corresponding varied
emotional intensity values across Angry and Happy conditions revealed that there were
statistically significant differences the two conditions at 2% (Angry: M = 0.78, SD =
0.12; Happy: M = 0.54, SD = 0.11; t[46] = 8.69, p < .001, d = 2.08); 10% (Angry: M =
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0.76, SD = 0.11; Happy: M = 0.51, SD = 0.10; t[46] = 10.22, p < .001, d = 2.41); 20%
(Angry: M = 0.70, SD = 0.10; Happy: M = 0.49, SD = 0.08; t[46] = 9.16, p < .001, d =
2.22); 40% (Angry: M = 0.57, SD = 0.09; Happy: M = 0.48, SD = 0.08; t[46] = 4.40, p <
.001, d = 1.09); and 90% (Angry: M = 0.49, SD = 0.07; Happy: M = 0.57, SD = 0.07;
t[46] = 4.74, p < .001, d = 1.01), even after correcting for multiple comparisons
(αcorrected=.006). No other comparisons were statistically significant (all ts ≤ 2.63, ps >
.01, ds < 0.67).

Figure 5. Proportion of correct responses for classification of crowds. Each panel depicts
performance across changes in varied emotion intensity, separately for face pairs in
which the constant emotion was either angry or happy. Error bars in each panel represent
95% confidence intervals.
We also compared accuracy for each Constant Emotion at each level of Intensity
against chance performance (i.e., 50% accuracy) using a series of one-sample t-tests.
When constant emotion was set to angry, the following intensity levels had accuracies
rates statistically significantly above chance performance: 2%, 10%, 20%, 40% (αcorrected
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= .006, all ts ≥ 5.30, ps < .001, ds ≥ 0.77). No other levels significantly differed from
chance (αcorrected = .006, all ts ≤ 1.77, ps ≥ .083, ds ≤ 0.26). When constant emotion was
set to happy, the following intensity levels had accuracies rates statistically significantly
above chance performance: 60%, 80%, 90%, and 100% (αcorrected = .006, all ts ≥ 3.93, ps
< .001, ds ≥ 0.57). No other levels significantly differed from chance (αcorrected = .006, all
ts ≤ 2.54, ps ≥ .015, ds ≤ 0.37).
We calculated Positive and Negative Affect for each observer based on their
responses to the PANAS questionnaire, which they completed before starting the task
(Pre-) and after completing the task (Post-). Comparing responses on the Pre- and PostPANAS questionnaires, there was a reduction in the Positive affect scale (Pre: M = 26.17,
SD = 6.45; Post: M = 21.11, SD = 5.78; t[46] = 5.14, p < .001, d = 0.63). There was no
statistically significant difference between the Pre- and Post- Negative affect scale (Pre:
M = 15.51, SD = 6.21; Post: M = 14.74, SD = 5.25; t[46] = 1.02, p = .31, d = 0.13). To
check if there was a relationship between observers’ mood and bias to report faces as
angry, we compared their affect scores as measured by the PANAS with their overall
criterion. There were no significant correlations between observers’ criterion and the
PANAS scales [all rs[47] < 0.24, all ps > .11].

Discussion
In Experiment 1, observers navigated crowds of varying ratios of angry to happy
faces. Observers were most accurate in classifying crowds of faces expressing the same
emotion (e.g., all eight faces displaying anger or happiness) and were the least accurate
when categorizing crowds with more balanced ratios (e.g., a crowd of three angry faces
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and five happy faces). Observers’ ability to discriminate between the two emotions also
depended on the intensity of expression; they categorized the emotions of crowds with
high intensity of facial expression better than crowds with low intensity of expression.
Anger bias emerged most strongly for judgments of crowds with low intensity of
expression. However, the ratio of angry to happy faces in a crowd did not impact the
extent of this bias. In Experiment 2, observers navigated crowds in which the number of
happy and angry faces were always matched, but where one category’s expressive
intensity was greater than that of the other. In general, observers were most sensitive and
most biased when discriminating between crowds with low and medium intensity of
expression. More specifically, observers were able to accurately classify crowds with
medium intensity of anger and low intensity of happiness, but they struggled with crowds
with medium intensity of happiness and low intensity of anger. Although observers
showed difficulty discriminating between mixed emotion crowds with medium and high
intensities, they did not engage anger bias.
Our main finding, that anger bias emerges in the context of evaluating crowds
with low intensities of expressions, is consistent with our hypotheses and previous work
(Mihalache, Lamer, Allen, Maher, & Sweeny, in revision). However, our hypothesis that
observers would further engage anger bias in response to more balanced ratios of angry to
happy faces (e.g., 5:3 compared with 6:2) was not supported. There are several possible
explanations: First, when judging crowds with low intensities of expression, observers
may be unable to reliably extract the ratio of angry to happy faces. To be able to obtain a
count of facial expressions, one needs to be able to identify the expressions first, and
observers showed difficulty categorizing even homogenous crowds when their faces
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displayed emotion with weak intensity. Second, bias seems to be engaged in the context
of perceptual uncertainty, but not necessarily in the context of contradictory information.
In other words, observers may have been confident in their perception of both “angry”
and “happy” faces within a crowd, but not in their ability to extract an accurate ratio of
each. Thus, sensitivity was low in response to more balanced ratios while bias also
remained low as faces displayed high intensity facial expressions. Not only are perceivers
more likely to make errors under these conditions and in turn reveal their biases, loss of
perceptual sensitivity may actually cause latent biases to emerge (Lynn & Feldman
Barrett, 2014).
A similar pattern was found in Experiment 2 with bias emerging in response to
lower intensity of expression while remaining low in the context of clear, but
contradictory information. Specifically, observers had a tendency to misclassify crowds
with mildly angry and moderately happy faces as more angry than happy. These findings
are consistent with previous research that found that perceivers may accumulate
information about low-intensity facial expressions slowly, which in turn allows for
random noise to push toward a false alarm (Mihalache, Lamer, Allen, Maher, & Sweeny,
in revision). Similar to Experiment 1, observers made many errors in response to mixedemotion crowds with higher intensity faces, and yet, these errors were not systematically.
It is not surprising that observers had difficulty discriminating between medium and high
intensity expressions as visual processes tend to become less sensitive farther away from
category boundaries (Hamad, 1987; Sweeny, Haroz, & Whitney, 2012), and because
facial expressions are categorically perceived (Fugate, 2013). Observers, therefore, are
likely encoding these faces as distinctly “angry” and “happy” and are not as sensitive to
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their differences in intensity. In other words, they may be confident in their perception of
these multiple facial expressions and yet mostly guessing when required to categorize
emotionally heterogenous crowds as either simply “angry” or “happy.” Thus, like in
Experiment 1 where observers exhibited low sensitivity and low bias when judging
imbalanced but high intensity crowds, observers in Experiment 2 also exhibited low
sensitivity and low bias when judging crowds with high intensity and contradictory
information. In short, when perceivers are uncertain about their perceptual information,
bias emerges. However, in the context of certain but potentially contradictory
information, perceivers do not engage systematic bias despite making many errors.
It is important to note that observers in these studies did not interact with the
crowds and, therefore, there were no significant consequences from their errors. It is
possible that in the context of real-world situations, even if observers are certain of
perceptual information, they may nonetheless be hesitant to engage with a crowd with
multiple angry members. Additionally, although we did not find a significant relationship
between a perceiver’s bias and their affective state at the time of the experiment (as
measured by the PANAS), it is possible that heightened affect, whether due to an
encounter with an actual crowd or through manipulation in the lab, may exacerbate anger
bias. For example, individuals with anxiety tend to interpret ambiguous information as
hostile (Bell et al., 2011), are quick to push away images of angry crowds (Lange et al.,
2008), and attribute higher emotional cost to interacting with groups than individuals
(Douilliez et al., 2012). They also tend to interpret ambiguous information as being
hostile (Bell et al., 2011; Yoon & Zinbarg, 2008), and are faster to push away images of
crowds when the number of angry members increases (Lange et al., 2008). Aggressive
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individuals are also biased to report ambiguously emotional faces as angry (Schönenberg
& Jusyte, 2014) and infer hostile intent in behaviors of others (Dodge, 2006; Knyazev et
al., 2008). Thus, further studies should examine how state or trait anxiety as well as other
characteristics like aggression impact anger bias.
Additionally, the faces in our crowds consisted only of White men, which allowed
us to compare anger bias in the context of mixed-emotion crowds to our own previous
research on emotionally homogenous crowds (Mihalache, Lamer, Allen, Maher, &
Sweeny, in revision), which featured the same stimulus set. However, it is possible that
anger bias may diminish or reverse for judgments of crowds of facial expressions of
women. Gender is differentially associated with emotion and affordance of threat (Becker
et al., 2007; Neel et al., 2012). Masculine faces tend to be associated with angry
expressions whereas feminine faces are more likely to be associated with happy or fearful
expressions (Hess et al., 2004). Indeed, our own preliminary research suggests that
perceivers engage anger bias in the context of low intensity female crowds, but they
endorse a happy bias in the context of high intensity female crowds. It is thus important
to evaluate how gender, both of the crowd and of the perceiver, may impact anger bias.
Lastly, it is unclear whether anger bias would persist, especially in the context of
mixed-emotion crowds, if observers had more time to evaluate them or render their
judgments. For example, delaying judgments and using reappraisal strategies can
diminish bias (Neta & Tong, 2016). Additionally, when perceivers have the opportunity
to scan the crowds serially, they may attend to some facial expressions more than others.
For example, some studies have found that perceivers tend to focus more on happy faces
(Bucher & Voss, 2019) in a crowd while others found that observers may have difficulty
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disengaging from angry faces (Goldenberg, Weisz, Sweeny, Cikara, & Gross, in press). It
is thus unclear how attentional processes, both automatic and conscious, may impact
anger bias.
In summary, we demonstrated that anger bias emerges when evaluating crowds
with low intensities of expression. Although observers had difficulty navigating crowds
with emotionally contradicting information, they did not endorse bias if these crowds
displayed high intensity facial expressions. In other words, anger bias seems to emerge in
the context of perceptual uncertainty, where perceivers are unsure of the content in the
faces, but it does not necessarily emerge in the context of any decision uncertainty, such
as when a crowd contains clear but contradictory information.
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CHAPTER 4: Summary and Limitations
This series of studies demonstrated that people are biased to classify facial
expression as angry, particularly in the context of perceptual uncertainty (in terms of
subtlety or visibility of facial expressions). When uncertainty was high, observers showed
a tendency to over-endorse anger for single faces and especially for crowds. This anger
bias was non-linearly related to crowd size, peaking when sets had approximately four
constituents. Bias to report anger occurred regardless of whether angry faces were
discriminated against positive (happy) or negative (fearful) expressions, indicating that it
did not simply reflect a generic negativity bias. Anger bias also occurred with equal
strength for crowds made up of identical or unique identities. When perceptual
uncertainty was high, anger bias presented itself independent of gender, although it was
strongest for evaluations of male faces.
When observers evaluated crowds with both angry and happy constituents, they
once again endorsed anger bias in response to crowds with low intensity of facial
expression. This bias did not depend on the ratio of angry to happy faces, possibly due to
difficulty extracting this information at low intensities of facial expression. Importantly,
anger bias emerged when judgments were difficult in the context of unclear or ambiguous
perceptual information, but not in the context of visibly clear yet contradictory
information. Specifically, perceivers had a tendency to judge crowds as angry when those
crowds consisted of happy and angry constituents expressing these emotions with low
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intensity. However, despite having difficulty classifying crowds that were closely
balanced in the number of angry and happy faces at higher intensities of expression,
perceivers did not produce systematic biases toward any particular emotion for their
judgments of these crowds. In summary, simply seeing multiple faces or contradictory
information about emotion in a crowd did not invariably trigger endorsements of anger.
Instead anger bias for crowds seemed to emerge when perceptual sensitivity was low as
the result of diagnostic visual information being scarce. Not only are perceivers more
likely to make errors under these conditions and in turn reveal their biases, but loss of
sensitivity may actually cause latent biases to emerge (Lynn & Feldman Barrett, 2014).
Limitations and future directions
It is important to evaluate the extent to which anger bias would persist outside the
lab. On the one hand, real-world events are often fraught with fleeting, chaotic, and
unpredictable information, requiring quick action. Being faced with a physical crowd also
poses more consequences and potential for harm in a way that judging faces on a screen
does not. On the other hand, in the real world, perceivers may also have more time to
evaluate the crowd as well as engage other processes. For example, delaying judgments
and using reappraisal strategies can diminish bias (Neta & Tong, 2016). Additionally,
when observers have the time to serially search the crowds, they may be susceptible to
the Angry Superiority Effect (ASE; Hansen & Hansen, 1988; Horstmann & Bauland,
2006; Öhman, Lundqvist, & Esteves, 2001) or the Happy Superiority Effect (HSE; Hunt
et al., 2007; Purcell, Stewart & Skov, 1996). Perceivers have been shown as more likely
to attend to happy faces, focus on them for longer durations, and evaluate them more
accurately (Bucher & Voss, 2019). However, they have also been shown to linger more
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on the angry faces in the crowd (Heinrichs and Hofmann, 2001; Goldenberg et al., in
press). Additionally, observers in my studies were limited to a binary decision. This was
a useful design as it allowed me to conduct signal detection analyses on my data, but it is
also true that decisions about behavior are often made based on binary, categorical
judgments. However, it is unclear whether perceivers would have engaged in anger bias
if they had not been forced into categorical decisions. Research on labeling of facial
expressions suggests that when perceivers are allowed to assign labels freely, they often
provide multi-dimensional evaluations, attributing a mixture of facial expressions to the
same face (Hall & Matsumoto, 2004; Riediger et al., 2011). In short, if perceivers had
been given more time and freedom to perceive and evaluate crowds, they may have relied
on additional processes that could have alleviated or exacerbated anger bias.
My stimuli were also limited. This choice was intentional. Using a restricted and
highly controlled stimulus set provided greater control to test anger bias under strict
conditions with high internal validity. This sort of approach has merit for initial
investigations of new phenomena, even though it may sacrifice generalizability in the
short run (Mook, 1983). Although I included some heterogeneity within crowds in terms
of identity, gender, and emotion in later experiments, these variables need to be evaluated
more thoroughly. For example, Young and colleagues (2013) found a positivity bias in
non-anxious individuals who evaluated crowds containing angry and happy faces as well
as male and female faces with full intensity facial expressions. To understand the
potential impact of gender on anger bias, it would be important to evaluate more
heterogenous crowds in terms of gender as well as measure gender attitudes in perceivers.
The majority of the crowds in my experiments also consisted of male identities while the
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majority of my observers were female. Thus, it is also important to examine the extent to
which anger bias would be diminished or amplified in the context of in-group and outgroup judgments, including gender and race, as well as context dependent in- and outgroups (e.g., fans of opposing sport teams or protesters versus police; Ackerman et al.,
2006, other?).
When evaluating the relationship between the perceiver and the crowd, it may
also be important to understand the extent to which perceivers view the crowd as a
cohesive group with shared goals and values. The elaborated social identity model
(ESIM) describes crowd behavior in the context of intergroup relations—not only does
the crowd influence its internal members, but the way an outsider views and acts toward
the crowd may also impact that crowd’s behavior (Drury & Reicher, 2000; Reicher,
1996; Stott & Reicher, 1998). For example, a few researchers have suggested police
officers may view crowds, such as sports fans and demonstration groups, as
heterogeneous and yet dichotomous, with the majority of constituents being
representative of the general public with peaceful intentions and with the minority of the
constituents as possessing intent to incite violence (Prati & Pietrantoni, 2009; Stott &
Reicher, 1998). They may also view the majority as easily susceptible to be manipulated
into violence, and, therefore, the entire crowd is seen as potentially dangerous. In other
words, a crowd is perceived as heterogenous and yet treated as homogenous. According
to these studies, police treatment can then influence the crowd members to shift toward
collective identity and resist the police. This behavior, in turn, can reinforce the police
officers’ initial perception that crowds are pathological, and that peaceful individuals can
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easily lose themselves and become “irrational and violent” in a crowd. Thus, additional
research is necessary to understand the dynamic between the perceiver and the crowd.
Although I gathered some information about the observers’ positive and negative
affect at the time of testing, I did not manipulate perceivers’ moods or gather any
additional information about their traits. For example, people with social anxiety tend to
attribute a higher emotional cost to interacting with groups than individuals (Douilliez et
al., 2012). They also tend to interpret ambiguous information as being hostile (Bell et al.,
2011; Yoon & Zinbarg, 2008), and are faster to push away images of crowds when the
number of angry members increases (Lange et al., 2008). Aggressive individuals are also
biased to report ambiguously emotional faces as angry (Schönenberg & Jusyte, 2014) and
infer hostile intent in behaviors of others (Dodge, 2006; Knyazev, 2008). Further studies
should examine state and trait anxiety as well as other characteristics like aggression or
risk-aversive attitudes to better understand which individuals may be particularly
susceptible to anger bias.
Finally, signal detection theory, conceptualized as a model of optimal decision
making, involves three parameters that impact uncertainty and risk (Lynn & Barrett,
2014). The first is the similarity between the targets and foils and underlies perceptual
sensitivity. I mainly manipulated this parameter through varying intensity of facial
expressions. However, I did not assess the impact of the second parameter—base rates—
as both angry and happy crowds appeared in equal frequency. Although people may not
have access to many base rates in the real world, it is possible that perceivers calibrate
their biases depending on assumptions of how frequently angry or happy expressions are
seen. For example, the assumed probability of encountering an angry or violent group at a
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rival sports event may differ from a classroom, and thus in turn may impact perceivers’
bias. Lastly, future studies should further examine the third parameter—payoff—which
refers to the relative costs of misses and false alarms. Although I suggested that
miscategorizing a crowd is more costly than an individual, I did not directly assess this.
Future studies should manipulate costs associated with different types of errors and how
this may impact bias in response to crowds. Additionally, it may be important to consider
anger bias in contexts in which asymmetry of costs may be inverted. For example, in
some circumstances it may be more adaptive to recalibrate anger bias. If one is starving
on an island or fleeing from an attacker at night and then stumbles upon a crowd, it may
be more adaptive to assume that the crowd is friendly and may help, as avoiding it may
pose greater consequences. In short, additional research is required to understand how
different parameters may exaggerate, diminish, or even reverse anger bias.
I demonstrated a bias to report anger on faces when visual information is scarce or
ambiguous, and I showed that this bias is amplified when perceivers evaluate crowds
relative to individuals. These findings complement the many examples of biased
processing of threat when it is more conspicuous, such as in the context of prioritized
attention (Dominguez-Borras & Vuilleumier, 2013), access to visual awareness (Capitão
et al., 2014), or during visual search (Gilbert et al., 2011; Huang et al., 2011). More
generally, this work illustrates the value of considering bias in addition to sensitivity,
especially for understanding how people see and understand information at the crowd
level.
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Appendices
Appendix A: Investigation 1

Below are plots displaying Hit and False Alarm Rates for every observer in each
condition in Experiments 1-6. Each circle represents a Hit and False Alarm Rate
combination from a unique observer. Circles to the left of the dashed diagonal line
represent combinations that yielded positive d' values. Circles closest to the upper left
corner reflect the highest d' values. Circles to the right of the solid diagonal line represent
combinations that yielded negative criterion values (anger bias). Circles closest to the
upper right corner reflect the most liberal use of the anger category. These scatterplots
illustrate how any individual observer can produce high perceptual sensitivity and liberal
bias, at the same time.
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Appendix B: Investigation 2

Experiment 1: Additional Analyses
The following are supplemental analyses for Experiment 1 from Investigation 2,
which allowed me to analyze the equally balanced heterogenous crowds of 4:4 angry to
happy faces. This was not possible with a signal detection theory (SDT) approach,
because SDT measures observers’ responses relative to an objective “correct response,”
and a crowd of 4:4 angry to happy faces does not have a correct response to the question,
“Is this crowd more angry or more happy?” I calculated point of subjective equality
(PSE) and just-noticeable difference (JND) measures (described below). For each ratio of
happy to angry faces in a crowd, I calculated the proportion of trials in which each
observer indicated a crowd as “angry” on average. I predicted that the likelihood of
categorizing crowds as “angry” would increase with ratio of angry to happy faces.
However, perceptual judgments are typically nonlinear due to the sensitivity required to
make discriminations around category boundaries. In other words, humans tend to be
more sensitive to changes around the neutral point and within slightly angry or happy
faces (around the categorical boundaries) and tend to perceive very angry and extremely
angry faces as just “angry” (less sensitive to changes far away from the boundary). Thus,
a logistic function, y = 1/(1+10^-(ax+b)), with a reflecting the slope of the line
(sensitivity) and b reflecting the shift of the line (bias) was likely to be the best fit for
observed data.
These logistic fits allowed me to derive two important metrics—the point of
subjective equality (PSE) and just-noticeable difference (JND). The PSE reflects the
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physical intensity of the stimulus (in this case the number of angry faces) at which an
observer classifies the crowd as angry 50% of the time. The JND refers to the bareminimum amount of change that an observer can reliably detect, measured by the amount
of change in the stimulus that leads to a 25% change in the observer’s response (the lower
the JND the more sensitive the observer). The JND is calculated by measuring the
amount of stimulus change required for the observer to shift from responding “angry”
25% of the time to 75% of the time, divided by 2.
I conducted one sample t-tests comparing the average PSE to four faces. If an
observer is unbiased, the PSE should be four (i.e., in a crowd of 4:4 angry to happy faces,
unbiased observers should be responding “angry” 50% of the time). I calculated PSEs
and JNDs for each observer and ran statistical tests over those distributions. In the high
intensity condition, the average PSE (M = 3.61; SD = 1.10) was significantly lower than
four, t(46) = 2.42, p = .019, d = 0.35). In the medium intensity condition, the average PSE
(M = 4.75; SD = 8.66) was not significantly different than four, t(46) = 0.59, p = .558, d
= 0.086. In the low intensity condition, the average PSE (M = 1.64; SD = 17.16) was also
not significantly different than four, t(46) = 0.94, p = .351, d = 0.14). Additionally, I ran a
repeated measures ANOVA with a dependent variable of the PSE shift and the
independent factor of emotional intensity (with 3 levels of low, medium, high). There
was no main effect of average PSE, F[2, 90] = 0.68, p = .51, ηp2 = 0.02). I also ran a
repeated measures ANOVA with a dependent variable JND and the independent factor of
emotional intensity There was no main effect of JND (High: M = 2.74, SD = 2.26;
Medium: M = 1.53, SD = 11.83; Low: M = 4.98, SD = 23.30; F[2, 90] = 0.58, p = .56, ηp2
= 0.01).
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Below are plots displaying Hit and False Alarm Rates for every observer in each
condition in Experiments 1-6. Each circle represents a Hit and False Alarm Rate
combination from a unique observer. Circles to the left of the dashed diagonal line
represent combinations that yielded positive d' values. Circles closest to the upper left
corner reflect the highest d' values. Circles to the right of the solid diagonal line represent
combinations that yielded negative criterion values (anger bias). Circles closest to the
upper right corner reflect the most liberal use of the anger category. These scatterplots
illustrate how any individual observer can produce high perceptual sensitivity and liberal
bias, at the same time.
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